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. INTRODUCTION

FOUNDATIONS
Globally, nearly 1 billion people live in urban slums.1 Nearly one third of the world's
urban population are slum dwellers, and in the urban south this proportion rises to a staggering
50 percent.2 This, given the recent population milestone of 7 billion, carries significant weight.
As areas of dense urban poverty are increasing around the world, so too is the need for effective
solutions. In order to combat this global issue, there need to be agents working to counterbalance
it: urban poverty is an alarming reality; however, it is not an unavoidable and inevitable problem.
1 Martínez, Javier, et al. “Trends in urban and slum indicators across developing world cities, 1990-2003.” Habitat
International. 2008, vol. 32:1. p.86.
2 McMichael, Philip. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press,
2008. p.212.
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Nor is it a chance phenomenon. People do not simply wake up one day with the sudden
conviction to move themselves and their families to the city where, due to their income, skill set,
and the availability of jobs, they will almost certainly be living in slums of the worst conditions
imaginable. Urban poverty is a problem that could be mitigated by states, yet is not.
Simultaneously, in Western cultures, there is a heavily prevalent culture of “helping” and
“giving back.” Volunteering and “outreach” projects are expected parts of building a collegeentrance resume, though the expectation of community service work does not end with university
applications. The notion that the “haves” should give to the “have nots” motivates many
individuals to donate clothes to church charities, volunteer hours at a soup kitchen, or collect
non-perishable food items for holiday can drives. At the same time, people in western cultures,
in addition to their personal actions, assume that the basic needs of the most vulnerable will be
taken care of by the state. Regardless of left or right political leanings, or opinions regarding
welfare, there is an expectation that the government will provide a minimal safety net for its
people. In other countries, this assumption cannot so easily be made. Many governments have
been hindered from maintaining a healthy Welfare State, for economic and political reasons
sometimes outside of their control. An increasingly believed doctrine is that development – and
economic growth – will only be made possible through less government in the social sector, and
more reliance on a free market system.
In situations where government has largely withdrawn from the social sector, the work of
non-state agents plays a large role. This paper examines how the free-market doctrine affects the
contemporary system of aid in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and analyzes the processes of primary
non-governmental aid organizations. It introduces the political and economic history of
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Argentina as a context from which to understand the current stage of actors in the social sector.
Drawing from my fieldwork in Buenos Aires, I introduce twelve organizations that work with
issues of poverty and development and explore themes and conclusions that can be made about
the culture of poverty alleviation programs, and what an effective program might look like.
Early on in my research I realized that “poverty alleviation programs” was not a suitable name
for these organizations; rather, they were more appropriately projects aimed towards decreasing
marginalization. Working from the context of a minimized state, this project examines the work
of these non-governmental organizations, comparing their proposed objectives, specific
initiatives, and self-perceptions in regards to how they fit into the greater structure of aid.
The paper is broken into three primary chapters, and each further organized into smaller
subsections. These chapters are: 1) the political and economic context of Argentina's villas, 2)
the case studies of the social organizations with whom I worked in Argentina and, 3) a proposal
of a project that takes into account both what I learned from existing organizations as well as
what I have learned regarding government.
The first chapter serves as a context for the rest of the paper; it is a historical overview to
give a comprehensive background for a more detailed analysis of current social organizations.
This context gives the “who” and the “why” of this study. In the first half of this chapter, the
“who” are identified as the poor – and specifically those living in the urban areas designated as
villas – in Buenos Aires. This section is a narrative of the Argentine villa, tracing its
development through the 20th century. It records when they first took shape, who first lived in
them, and how they grew. This is not intended to be a full history of the villa, rather a brief
background so that the modern villa can be situated.
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As the history of the villa is deeply political, the contextual section next looks at how
villa dwellers, most notably in the past thirty years, have been affected by state action – or
inaction. The goal of this second portion is to examine what political and economic influences
led to the current socioeconomic situation in Argentina, how the state has responded to the
problems brought about by strategies chosen, and what new issues have surfaced in this new
culture. The “why,” then, is the political and economic policy adopted by the government that
necessarily affects villa dwellers. Specifically, this paper will discuss Argentina's neoliberal
strategies of the last thirty years, as they have most affected the poor. The description of the villa
and the explanation of policies necessarily go together: in defining the “who,” one must explain
the policies enacted that have further entrenched the poor in poverty; likewise, in discussing the
“why,” one must also understand the circumstances of those most negatively affected. Through
the broad historical format, as well as a critical look at specific policy changes, this section gives
a comprehensive view of both the progression of villas in Buenos Aires, as well as the political
and economic circumstances that shaped them.
The second chapter exhibits twelve of the organizations with which I worked in Buenos
Aires and draws conclusions on the non-governmental aid system in Buenos Aires from these
case studies. The case study chapter is divided into three sections: the first is an introduction of
the twelve organizations that make up the comparative study; the second identifies certain similar
and dissimilar traits; and the third section analyzes the more abstract themes that became evident
in my time with these projects.
Finally, the third chapter is an application of these conclusions in the form of a project
proposal; a submission on how most suitably to combine the best of the programs I examined
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while leaving behind their weaknesses. This section serves as a practical exercise of the project.
Acknowledging the organizations with which I have worked and studied, I propose a new
alternative, gleaning strategies from each and – as it is a proposed project in a theoretical vacuum
– discarding those aspects shown ineffective. I am neither arrogant nor naive enough to believe
that this is the only way to run an organization in Buenos Aires, nor do I maintain that its
performance would be flawless; however, it is based on significant time spent working with and
studying organizations focused on similar issues, and combines elements that have been shown
to affect utility of such projects. While certainly being far from perfect, I submit it as an
additions to the on-going conversation of what needs to exist for change to take place.
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. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT.

I. VILLAS: A HISTORY
One hand clutching that of my little guía's as she led the way, the other with a firm grasp
on an oversized, brightly colored plastic bag full of leftover lunch supplies, a mostly-empty two
gallon water jug, and a fútbol, I followed nine-year old Milagros3 as she and her sister Isabel
escorted Aurelie and me through the back alleys of Ciudad Oculta—a slum of Buenos Aires—at
dusk on a bitingly cold Saturday in late May. We had left the paved road, and now found
ourselves on a narrow dirt alley-way that was densely lined by tin, wood, cement, and cardboard
shacks three and four stories high. The ground was uneven and the alley narrow, making it

3 Names of individuals have been changed.
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nearly impossible for cars to get through; even motorcycles would only occasionally make their
way between the people-filled passages, littered with trash and lethargic stray dogs. Already
there were men setting up grills and coolers of beer; cumbia blasted from a radio carried by a
teenager as several of his friends began to dance around him; the small dirt streets were lit up by
lanterns and single-bulb lights hanging on wires from doorway to doorway. The indistinct grays
and blacks which I had come to associate with this place were transformed by the sporadic light
into hazy browns and even blacker blacks, in the shadows and between buildings.
Aurelie and I, interns at CARE Argentina, had taken 19 children between the ages of 9
and 14 from this villa on the outskirts of Buenos Aires to a touristy area in the city for a
photography workshop. We had aimed to have them home in time to get ourselves back to our
office before dark, but the buses that go to the villas run less frequently on weekend evenings
and the trip into the slum took much longer than normal. Now we found ourselves being led
through small backstreets and passages that cut between rows of houses, stacked one on top of
another, to where we could hire a car to take us back to the city center. As I walked, I watched
the villa come alive in a way that it never had during the day, and I was very conscious of the
Disney bag I was toting, of my blondness and Aurelie's frenchness, and of the fact that these two
little girls – our charges – were the ones “protecting” us; they were our “in.” The girls moved
without fear, though they also did not greet anyone. They would occasionally look back over
their shoulders at us, to let us know that we were almost there, though the carefree chatter from
the day spent taking photos in the market was noticeably absent. This was their home, and we
were not in danger, per se—yet the tenseness was clear, and all four of us hurried through the
darkened maze of the villa interior.
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Not only are slums like this are common in Argentina, they are recurrent realities in
nearly every Latin American city: Alan Gilbert describes shantytowns as the “archetypal symbol
of housing in Latin America.”4 In fact, CEPAL statistics from 2002 show urban poverty in Latin
America at 38.4 percent, and extreme urban poverty at 13.5 percent.5 In Greater Buenos Aires
specifically, it is estimated that 10 percent of the metropolitan population are slum dwellers or
live in an informal settlement of some kind.6 Between 2001 and 2006, the number of people
living in the villas of Buenos Aires doubled from 639,000 to 1.14 million7, no doubt largely as a
result of the social, political, and economic crisis of 2001-2002, though the numbers of residents
in these areas did not decrease as other economic indicators stabilized in the years following the
crisis. In fact, villa populations continue to rise, in Argentina and across the continent.
Undoubtedly, Milagros and Isabel do not remember the events of late 2001 that spiraled
Argentina into deep recession, nor do they understand the political reasoning behind the national
leaders' actions. They do, however, live with the consequences of these actions. Daily, their
lives are shaped by the hardships and inequality of life in a villa: their education is substandard,
access to food and potable water is unreliable, and safety is always a concern. Throughout their
lives, they will face difficulties and make decisions far different from other girls their age, and
they will always find themselves at a disadvantage in society. While these two may only know
of the crisis through the memories of their parents, they live the daily reality of its marginalizing
effects, and feel the sharp distinction of being “the other.”
4 Gilbert, Alan. The Latin American City. London: Latin American Bureau, 1994. p.79.
5 Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt. “Fractured Cities, second-class citizenship and urban violence.” Fractured
Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence & Contested Spaces in Latin America. Eds. Kees Koonings & Dirk
Kruijt. New York: Zed Books, 2007. 7-22. p.9.
6 Auyero, Javier and Débora Alejandra Swistun. Flammable: Environmental Suffering in an Argentine
Shantytown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p.23.
7 Ibid., p.23.
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Media gives us visuals of these spaces through films like City of God, Slumdog
Millionaire, Favela Rising and City of Joy: they show images of acres of shacks built out of tin
and plywood, young barefoot children playing unattended, drug lords controlling neighborhoods,
and a culture inspiring neither desire nor rationale to attend school. Although “success stories”
of individuals escaping these lives of poverty become box-office successes, the reality is that
most people born into poverty will not be able to break free from it. Children born poor are less
likely to finish secondary – “in 2002, only two out of ten 'poor' youth finished or went beyond
high school”8 –, and it is increasingly improbable to earn enough to live above the poverty line
with only a primary education.9 Economists Ricardo Morán, Tarsicio Castañeda, and Enrique
Aldaz-Carroll discuss how Intergenerational Transition of Poverty (ITP) – the idea that a child is
necessarily “trapped” into the same poverty of his or her parents – renders children unable to
“reach lifetime income and consumption levels that would lift them out of poverty.”10 Despite
also showing falsely sensational stories of rags-to-riches successes, popular culture does give
haunting impressions of poverty and filth, danger and drugs, overpopulation and under-education
that, indeed, are often very close parallels to the reality of these areas.
One of the starkest examples of this that I have seen in Buenos Aires is Villa 31.11 The
oldest, largest, and most known shantytown in Buenos Aires, Villa 31 is located quite literally
“on the wrong side of the tracks.” Positioned on a 0.34 km2 parcel of land between the train and
8 Barbeito, Alberto C. and Laura Goldberg. “Social Policy and Economic Regime in Argentina: Crisis and
Retrenchment of Social Protection.” Latin America: A New Developmental Welfare State Model in the Making?
Ed. Manuel Riesco. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 187-216. p.197.
9 Morán, et al. “Family Background and Intergenerational Poverty in Latin America.” Escaping the Poverty Trap:
Investing in Children in Latin America. Ed. Ricardo Morán. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank,
2003.15-58. p.21.
10 Ibid., p.16.
11 Though technically this area is composed of two villas – Villas 31 and 31 Bis –, they are often categorized and
referred to as one.
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bus stations, just blocks away from one of the most expensive shopping districts of the city, this
slum of over 26,000 people (a low estimate, by many opinions) is a not-so-hidden reminder of
the extreme marginalization that exists in Buenos Aires.12 The residents of Villa 31 live in the
midst of one of the most trafficked parts of the city, a short walk from the financial district of the
capital, and – with a ratio of over 85,000 persons per km2 – are crowded into makeshift houses
built five and six stories high. One cannot take a bus or northbound train out of the city without
this clear example of the wealth disparity present in Argentina, a country often excluded from the
“poor” or “developing” country lists.
Of course, the economic crisis of 2001 and 2002 has escalated the dire situation in villas
like 31. One calculation shows that the rate of extreme poverty in Argentina increased from 9.3
percent in 2000 to 12.6 percent in 2001, and then skyrocketed to 26.2 percent in 2002.13
Certainly, the villas and their inhabitants can be assumed to have been the primary recipients of
the harsh realities of these statistics. However, the narrative of the bonaerense villa begins not in
2001, nor even in the 1980s or 90s with the globally-experienced debt crises and subsequent loan
refinancing; indeed, the history of the villa has roots much further back in the century.
In Argentina, the history of the villa as it is known now begins in the early 20th century
when the country began the process of industrialization, and started to open itself up to the global
market. According to Davide G. Erro, the early part of the century was a “liberal period …
marked by rapid growth and close integration with the world economy.”14 This integration

12 Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Censo de Hogares y Población. Villas 31 y 31 bis. Buenos Aires: Gobierno de la Ciudad de
Buenos Aires, 2009.
13 Şenses, Fikret, and Murat Koyuncu. “Socioeconomic Effects of Economic Crises: A Comparative Analysis of the
Experiences of Indonesia, Argentina, and Turkey.” Argentina: Economic, Political and Social Issues. Ed. Jeanne
B. Haverland. Nova Science Publishers, Inc: New York, 2009. 51-77. p.58.
14 Erro, Davide G. Resolving the Argentine Paradox. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. p.12.
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deepened when, in the 1940s, Perón adopted and strictly implemented an Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) economic model, which favored nationally manufactured goods over
international imports through providing domestic industries with subsidies and tariff
protections.15 ISI led to the development of a new and large manufacturing sector, which was
primarily based in the urbanized capital city. At this time, Argentina was already a country with
high numbers of immigrants entering from Europe through the port city of Buenos Aires.
However, as industrialization gained momentum, the demographics of immigrants coming into
the city shifted from being largely international to consisting mainly of rural Argentines, seeking
economic betterment. The lure of jobs created by the new industrialization – combined with
weak agriculture economies in the outer provinces – led to a massive influx of immigrant
workers to Buenos Aires.
Leaving their homes of rural poverty in the interior, Argentines relocated to the capital
hoping for employment and, upon arrival, sought inexpensive housing. Across Latin America,
the first kind of low income housing was tenement-style rentals. At this time, large houses in the
city were used by all social classes: wealthy families would have the entire space to themselves
and their servants, whereas in poorer classes the house would be shared by multiple families,
each occupying an individual room. Regionally, these shared tenement buildings were known by
different names; in Argentina, they were called inquilinatos or conventillos.16 For those splitting
these buildings between multiple families, living conditions were quite poor: the average
conventillo had 15 rooms, each housing approximately 3.3 persons. However, these tenements
were conveniently located near employment, and so the conditions were tolerated—certainly,
15 Barbeito, op. cit., p.188.
16 Gilbert, op. cit., p.79.

14

too, the situation was still considerably better than the conditions of the modern villa.
The inevitable dilemma was that although the physical space within the city limits for
these buildings was finite, the internal migration neither ceased nor slowed. Nearly 750,000
migrants moved from rural Argentina to Buenos Aires between 1937 and 1947.17 As these
crowded tenements eventually filled up, newcomers began to establish informal communities on
the outskirts of town, squatting on unclaimed – and, for the most part, unwanted – land. Buenos
Aires is surrounded by marshland, and many of these first squatter settlements were located on
land that was hard to build on and prone to flooding. These makeshift settlements were
considered by most to be temporary housing solutions; they were cheap and provided easy access
to the city and to work. This “self-help” housing is a trend seen across Latin America, a result of
the poor having no other option.18 At the same time, this form of housing was not necessarily
considered a curse; rather, it was a self-produced ownership. The substandard conditions were
believed to be temporary, and living in the villas themselves was not principally seen as a
negative option. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that forging a home of one's own would be
seen positively, as marking propriety and personal achievement. Later, when the residents' right
to the land was disputed, inhabitants of villas would work together to fight for their homes,
which they saw as rightfully and respectably theirs.
However, villas today are visions that provoke thoughts of third-world countries.
Housing materials are limited, and often include mostly what can be collected at night from trash
heaps left on street corners in the city. Infrastructural services are scant; electricity and cable are
often stolen from a single source, with wires spreading like a spiderweb to an entire block of
17 Auyero, Javier. “‘This is a Lot Like the Bronx, isn’t it?’ Lived Experiences of Marginality in an Argentine
Slum.” International Journal of Urban & Regional Research 23.1 (Mar. 1999). 45-69. p.53.
18 Gilbert, op. cit., p.80.
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residences. Auyero writes of the early settlements in Buenos Aires as being situated in “lagoonlike” areas with a “lack of urban services [such as] water, sewage, garbage collection, electricity
and other facilities.”19 However, the poor conditions of squatter settlements were tolerated by
their inhabitants because of the general belief and resolute hope that slum life was temporary.
Whether they believed that the Peronist government would build new apartments to house them,
or considered themselves – as part of the working class – to be on a track of upward social
mobility, these early slum dwellers were convinced that the slum was “a transient step from rural
despair to urban advancement.”20 What ended up being the reality for most of these “temporary”
residents of the early villas, however, was far from what they had expected. Instead of being
able to work themselves out of the situation, they stayed. Indeed, villa populations continued to
grow throughout the century. In the mid 1950s, only 2 percent of Buenos Aires' population was
living in a villa. In 1970, this number had nearly doubled, and only ten years later, in 1980, had
doubled again: nearly 957,000 people were now recorded to be living in a squatter settlement.21
As people continued to move to Buenos Aires seeking work, these villas continued to grow, and
became more instead of less permanent.
Through the century, as more and more immigrants moved into Buenos Aires, the
availability of jobs – what had pulled them to the city in the first place – began to decrease. All
across Latin America, the number of immigrants moving to urban centers for work superseded
the availability of jobs in those cities. As Portes and Benton report, “between 1950 and 1980, the
total Latin American economically active population grew at an annual rate of 2.5 percent, but

19 Auyero, op. cit. (Bronx), p.54.
20 Ibid., p.54.
21 Gilbert, op. cit., p.82.
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the urban labor force increased at a rate of 4.1 percent per year.”22 Moreover, as recessions hit,
the informal economies grew, and wages in the formal economy plunged. In the 1980s, “real
manufacturing wages fell by 23 per cent” in Argentina.23 The villas were not only growing
bigger, they were growing poorer.
The history of the villa and the development of Buenos Aires' urban poverty cannot be
told without concurrently relating the political history of the same period. A summary of the
adoption of import substitution industrialization as merely the instigator of internal migration and
therefore the onset of increased urban poverty is inadequate. Alberto C. Barbeito and Laura
Goldberg examine how the period of ISI economic transition also marked the early stages of a
Welfare State (WS) model that would last through the 1980s. They identify the period leading
up to Juan Perón's presidency – the late 1800s and early 1900s – as the “embryonic” stage of the
Welfare State. At this time, government focused itself on providing universal basic education
and establishing the infrastructure and communications networks necessary for an agro-export
model. These initiatives were largely successful: whereas in the mid-1800s illiteracy was at 80
percent, by 1914 it had fallen to less than 25 percent. The authors identify the end of the
“embryonic” WS with the beginning of Perón's presidency. As the Secretary of Labour and
Welfare (1943-45) and later as president (1946-55), Perón launched the development of typical
WS institutions, creating and shaping the way the state would interact with the public sector for
the rest of the century.24 ISI, then, served not only as a pull factor for people to migrate to the
city, but also as a vehicle by which the country created the foundation for its Welfare State,

22 Portes, Alejandro and Laura Benton. “Industrial Development and Labor Absorption: A Reinterpretation.”
Population and Development Review. 10, 589-611. p.593.
23 Gilbert, op. cit., p.73.
24 Barbeito, op. cit., p.188.
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which would become so vital for those migrating.
Two factors that separate Argentina's experience from that of other countries who have
had similar industrialization-led development, however, are the policies by which Perón
implemented social welfare, and the general insecurity of Argentina's politics. Perón ran a
system which was largely favor-for-vote, creating a paternalistic relationship between society
and state. This theme of clientelism will be revisited later, in the discussion of current
shortcomings of the welfare state. Even larger than that, though, is the nature of political
instability in Argentina, and how social and economic development in Argentina was not
accompanied by political stability, as it was in European examples; as such, it should come as no
surprise that the results be so vastly dissimilar.
A change in public policy towards villas and villa inhabitants came in 1955 with the
ousting of Perón from power and the subsequent military regime. State policies in response to
the villas chanted with the removal of Perón, as “the Revolución Libertadora began to consider
the slum a problem: not only a housing problem, but a social one as well.”25 At this point, villas
began to gain recognition by state and society: the government labeled them villas de
emergencia, and Argentine writer Bernado Verbitsky's novel Villa Miseria también es América
(Villa Miseria is also [a part of] the Americas) gave the shantytowns another new and lasting
name. The government solution to this newly identified dilemma was for the sudden “removal
of the emergency slums.”26 These eviction threats sparked movements among the villa dwellers
to publicly claim the land that they inhabited and fight back against the forces attempting to drive
them out. In the 1950s and 60s, neighborhood councils were created whose purpose was to

25 Auyero, op. cit. (Bronx), p.55.
26 Ibid., p.55.
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improve the quality of life within the villa. Auyero refers to these groups' actions as “problem
solving” and “claim-making,” and indicates that this was the initiation of a new stage in villa
history: villas were now communities with a collective voice and motives for solidarity.
Over the course of the 20th century, the development of the villa has been gradual, yet
significant. For early internal migrants coming to Buenos Aires, employment was of key
concern – not housing. Accordingly, cheap “self-help” housing with terrible living conditions
was deemed livable, especially with the belief that it was temporary. Villas were merely a shortterm solution to a side effect that came from an economic shift towards industrialization. They
became, however, long-term problems of their own right. The “temporary” housing solution
which reversed itself; rather, it only grew worse. Conditions that were acceptable when they
were thought to be short-term became permanent obstacles to be survived: poorly made streets,
lack of electricity, water, and sewage. However, what was seen as temporary 80 years ago now
continues to exist as a burden of survival on the poor.
Through Perón's presidency, villas were no more than unofficial squatter settlements,
hoping in the clientelistic nature of the WS to move them from their situation. By the time the
military dictatorship was underway, however, this mentality had transitioned to one of
community solidarity and collective bargaining. The years between 1960 and 1983 brought
other political changes – government changed democratic and military hands three more times –
and saw the further progression of the slums from transient squatter settlements to permanent
poor residences. Auyero describes the transition of the villa well, from being portrayed “as the
ultimate example of the failure of Peronist populism during the '50s, as project sites for the
modernizing dreams of the '60s, as hotbeds where revolution was thought to be germinating
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during the '70s, as obstacles to progress during the dictatorship of the '80s, and as places of
immorality, crime, and lawlessness in contemporary Argentina.”27 Whether known as villas,
villas de emergencia, or villas miserias, these locations are indeed the unfortunate centers of
crime and danger portrayed in contemporary media. They are also, however, the unmistakable
homes of families like those of Milagros and Isabel, who are growing up knowing no other
environment.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
As the narrative of the villa continues, it becomes increasingly and unavoidably political.
From the beginning, of course, state policies and actions have played a direct role in the lived
experiences of villa inhabitants. The previous section detailed how, in the 1930s, villas were
introduced as temporary housing constructed for the influx of workers that came to Buenos Aires
for jobs created by a new national economic strategy; then, in the 1950s and 60s, how the
government developed strategies to evict villeros from their homes. The conclusion is clear:
government policies have intrinsically defined the situation of the villa. In the past thirty years,
however, the government has played an even more powerful role in the well-being of those
living in villas.
The past three decades have been ones of great change for Argentina. Only in 1983 did
the last military dictatorship give way to democracy, leaving in its wake not only the horrific
legacy of the Dirty War, but also the results of unsustainably high borrowing and spending. The
1980s brought massive debt crises to all of Latin America, Argentina included. Forced to

27 Auyero, op. cit. (Flammable), p.22.
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refinance their debt alongside countless other similarly situated countries, Argentina entered a
period of structural reform during the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Menem. Then, in
2001, the country underwent an economic crisis much larger than any of the previous recessions
and, with an infrastructure weakened by Menem's policy changes in the 90s, hugely devastating
to the poorest populations of Argentina. The past ten years have seen a country struggling to
regain balance and reverse the effects of having over half of the country's population fall beneath
the poverty line.28
This section looks briefly at the circumstances leading to Menem's presidency; critically
examines the conditions of Argentina under his leadership, especially in regards to his rigid
adherence to neoliberalism; describes the crisis of 2001 with interest in how it shaped the poor,
changed politics, and in what ways the consequences were impacted by the system set up by
Menem in the preceding years; and finally, concludes with how the state interacts with its public
sector, post-Menem and post-2001.

PRE-MENEM YEARS
Global circumstance has shaped Argentina and the economic crises of the last thirty
years. The end of the military regime in Argentina was marked as a period of high international
borrowing and substantial government spending. The price of oil increased in the 1970s, due in
large part to market manipulations by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and resulting in a sudden increase in capital to oil exporting countries. Private banks
found themselves faced with an inundation of deposits from oil exporters, and began to look for
28 Romero, Luis Roberto. “The Argentine Crisis: A Look at the Twentieth Century.” The Argentine Crisis at the
Turn of the Millennium: Causes, Consequences, and Explanations. Eds. Flavia Fiorucci and Marcus Klein.
Peasant Academic Publishers: Amsterdam, 2004. 15-39. p.31.
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new markets in which to invest this new capital. As developed Western nations were facing their
own recessions at the time, Latin American countries seemed the ideal borrower: they had better
credit than other developing nations and, as sovereign states, were imagined to be invulnerable to
bankruptcy.29 Exchange rates for these loans, though variable – a crucially important aspect,
later – were contracted exceptionally low, to the extent that the borrowing governments viewed
this new money as “free.” In an attempt to garner short-term support from their citizens, Latin
American civilian and military governments alike used this influx of capital on current
consumption projects, spending the borrowed funds without much caution, due to the low rates.
This period of extreme borrowing and spending did give the public sector certain goods and
infrastructural support; however, it also left borrowing nations like Argentina highly vulnerable
to outside change and influence.30
Predictably, this arrangement came crashing down when, in the early 1980s, the United
States and Europe tightened their financial policies to counter internal stagflation, increasing
foreign exchange and interest rates. Debtor countries were left with less and less foreign
exchange in their accounts as interest rates on existing loans dramatically increased, the costs of
debt service rose and, simultaneously, prices for Latin American exports plunged. The game was
up for Latin American countries. Despite having already begun taking out new loans to repay
old ones, countries could keep up the act no longer. Starting with Mexico in 1982, countries
across the globe reneged on their loans, causing great unrest and panic to their international
loaners.31

29 Skidmore, Thomas E, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. Modern Latin America, 7th Edition. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010. p.368.
30 Ibid., p.368.
31 Hershberg, Eric, and Fred Rosen. “Turned the Tide?” Latin America After Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the
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Western countries responded to these widespread defaults by taking an increasingly more
involved role in the political structure and economic development of Latin American countries.
Financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – which were
created in 1944 by United Nations leaders at a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
for the rebuilding of Europe after WWII – were transformed into international debt refinancers,
allowing their member states to play a hand in developing nations' political and economic
decisions. The IMF, specifically, converted from a stabilizer of short-term trade imbalances to
that of a long-term debt manager. The catch of this new plan with the newly remodeled IMF was
that reneging countries could only receive debt refinancing if they followed specific policy
changes. Being in the position of defaulting borrowers, Latin American nations were compelled
to accept the refinancing agreements offered by the IMF, as well as the adjustment programs with
which they came.32 These internationally imposed political and economic reforms that were
imperatively tied to debt refinancing solutions were part of the Neoliberal model, and came as a
sharp blow to Latin American countries after a period of such high borrowing and spending.

NEOLIBERALISM AND MENEM'S NINETIES
Of all the changes and periods of policy in the past thirty years, perhaps the most
influential for Argentine politics, economy and society—and the most crucial to understanding
the current socio-political situation—is that of Carlos Menem's presidency and his adherence to
the neoliberal strategy. Without doubt, Menem's government was detrimental to the lower
classes: from those living just above or at the poverty line to the extremely, or indigently, poor.
21st Century? Eds. Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen. New York: The New Press, 2006. 1-25. p.6.
32 Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. p.29, 40.
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Under Menem, Argentina took on massive structural reform under the banner of neoliberalism,
which brought extreme changes to both the welfare state and the poor peoples' position in
society. His policies aligned with the values of the IMF and created a weakened and more
vulnerable poor population, with an excessively small safety net for protection against any
systematic failure.33 This section focuses on how the neoliberal reforms of privatization,
reduction of state spending, and elimination of subsidies, among others and with the added level
of the Convertibility Plan, caused a deterioration in the social sector of Argentina, lent to the
collapse of the economy in 2001, and made recovery after the crisis an even more difficult and
slow process.
Neoliberalism, a neoclassical approach to national development, can be seen in Latin
American political economies as early as the 1970s, when General Augusto Pinochet completely
restructured Chile's economy with the help of the 'Chicago Boys,' a group of Chileans who had
studied economics at the University of Chicago, with strong affiliations to the neoliberal theories
of Milton Friedman.34 It was in the 1980s, though, when most other Latin American countries
began the transition to largely neoliberal economic reform. Believing that a free market structure
with minimal government would yield the most economic growth and be the most conducive to
the stabilization of developing countries, a group of conservative economists, led by the World
Bank's Bela Balassa, “produced the equivalent of a capitalist manifesto for bringing growth to
third world countries” in the mid-1980s.35 This neoliberal mission statement was widely
distributed in Latin America, and served as a grounds for liberal reformers to seek structural
33 Llanos, Mariana. “Understanding Presidential Power in Argentina: a Study of the Policy of Privatisation in the
1990s.” Journal of Latin American Studies. 33 (2001): 67-100.
34 Harvey, op. cit., p.8.
35 Portes, Alejandro. “Neoliberalism and the Sociology of Development: Emerging Trends and Unanticipated
Facts.” Population and Development Review. 23.2 (1997). p.237.
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change. Neoliberalism, however, does not simply refer to the change towards policies which
tended toward a much higher dependency on a free market; rather, it also includes “a wholesale
change in the relationship between the state and society, with a more vigorous embrace of the
market being part of a generalized withdrawal of state provisioning and action.”36 It is this
change in the relationship between government and people, then, that has caused many to
question the net benefits of neoliberal policies.
The neoliberal strategies that emerged from “Western” policymakers came to be known
as the Washington Consensus, and were enforced by the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. Neoliberal programs implemented by governments worldwide were known by
many different names, yet precipitated similar results: from austerity policies to structural
adjustment policies to neoliberal reforms to shock treatments, these policy changes crippled the
poor and dictated that governments remain nearly inactive in the social sector. These massive
political and economic changes were made by developing countries across the globe in efforts to
not default on their international loans and to stabilize their economies.37 The international
pressure to comply with these policies was high: the private lending institutions and the nations
behind the Bretton Woods Institutions had keen interest in the success of neoliberalism.
Argentine president Carlos Menem's strongly neoliberal policies of the 1990s, then, were
on par with the rest of Latin America. However, it has been noted that Argentina's structural
adjustment program was “one of the broadest and most rapid in the Western Hemisphere.”38

36 Walton, Michael. “Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good, Bad, or Incomplete?” Latin American Research
Review. 39.3 (2004): 165-184. p.165.
37 Brooks, Sarah M. “International Financial Institutions and the Diffusion of Foreign Models for Social Security
Reform in Latin America.” Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform. Ed. Kurt Weyland.
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004. 53-80. p.69.
38 Gerchunoff, P. and G. Cánovas, Las Privatizaciones en la Argentina: Impactos micro y macroeconómicos. (Chile,
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Additionally, the very pretext by which Menem introduced these policies was widely questioned.
Menem, a Peronist, ran for – and won – the presidency with a very protectionist campaign. This
was not a surprise as, historically, Peronism has been virtually synonymous with populism. And,
although Menem believed that market-oriented reforms would be the best economic plan for the
country, he “thought [he] would lose the election if [he] announced this during the campaign.”39
Because of this, the quick switch to neoliberal free-market structural adjustments was a shock to
Argentine economy and society, both in the sense of the harsh ramifications, as well as in the
perceived ideological change of mind of the leader. In 1989, when Menem took the presidency,
he “adopted in full the reform and re-adjustment programme, applying it in its simplest, most
brutal and destructive form: an unrestricted financial opening to international markets and a
completely reckless privatization of state companies”.40 Menem would proceed to hold office
for ten years, a time that would be marked by his staunch loyalty to the neoliberal ideology and
reform schedule.
However, the reforms that Menem implemented during the first years of his presidency
were largely unsuccessful. In his first two years as president, Menem did not “fix” any of
Argentina's economic problems: though inflation was reduced, it was not contained; prices
jumped again in 1990; instead of improving, the recession begun in 1988 only worsened, causing
the GDP to plummet.41 It was not until a few years into his term that Menem began the
implementation of extreme structural adjustments. One of Menem's most influential actions was
1994), as quoted by Llanos, op. cit., p.67.
39 Acuña, Carlos H., Sabastián Galiani, and Mariano Tommasi. “Understanding Reform: the Case of Argentina.”
Understanding Market Reform in Latin America: Similar Reforms, Diverse Constituencies, Varied Results. Ed.
José María Fanelli. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 31-72. p.39.
40 Romero, op. cit., p.30.
41 Schvarzer, Jorge. “The Costs of the Convertibility Plan: The Economic and Social Effects of Financial
Hegemony.” Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy. Eds. Edward Epstein and David
Pion-Berlin. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006. 71-91. p.73.
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in 1990, when he appointed Domingo Cavallo as his financial director, and with him created the
Convertibility Plan. This had two primary facets: first, it gave the peso a fixed rate by pegging it
to the dollar, effectively freezing the exchange rate at an unsustainable level and, second, it
mandated that the government create no new money.42
The Convertibility Plan of 1991 was perhaps the most pivotal step of the reform process,
as it included “monetary reform, fiscal reform (simplification of the tax system and strengthening
of the tax collection agency), liberalization of domestic and external markets, and strengthening
of the privatization program.”43 By this time, the introduction of the Convertibility Plan into
such an economic environment was:
seen as a type of shock program that apparently sought to end inflation and
produce a new direction for the Argentine economy. Its initial successes, as much
in respect to price stabilization as in the mentioned cyclical recovery of economic
activity, contributed to give it a halo of success that did not always correspond
with reality.44
There was, indeed, initial success with the Plan. The new neoliberal strategies seemed to have
positive social effects: the percentage of those living under the poverty line dropped from 40.4
percent to 23.0 percent between 1990 and 1992. However, throughout the decade, poverty
increased, reaching 33.1 percent in 2000; by 2002, 55.3 percent of Argentina was living in
poverty. Just as development of the early villas were indications of the country's economic shift
towards industrialization, “the explosion of shantytowns in contemporary Argentina is deeply

42 Ibid., p.73.
43 Acuña et al, op. cit., p.40.
44 Schvarzer, op. cit., p.73.
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imbricated with structural adjustment and deindustrialization.”45 Unemployment rates dropped,
and even poverty indicators showed a positive economic turn. However, the Convertibility Plan
and its synchronous structural reforms deepened the vulnerability of the nation to external
factors, and ended in ultimate failure.
One of the key executive decisions that Menem and his council made was to bundle the
reforms. Macro-economic stabilization was crucially important to Menem, and he used
neoliberal structural adjustment policies to achieve this goal. In fact, as Acuña et al describes,
“the structural reform package was also the stabilization program and vice versa.”46 Thus, the
Convertibility Plan was put into effect with such reforms as privatization of some of the largest
public companies and services; reducing or eliminating subsidies on food crops and staples such
as yerba maté and sugar; and removing import barriers. Even those who support the structural
reform process acknowledge that this merging of policies was, ultimately, a handicap to the
government, as “public opinion perceived the failure of the stabilization as the failure of the
reform package as a whole.”47 The combination of privatization, a wholesale cut of subsidies,
and the absolute reduction of state spending only furthered the social and economic retrenchment
of the nation.
A budget cut is an obvious hit to the poor. It is with this policy that it becomes evident
how the poor are being doubly wounded. In regards to villas, Menem's policies had direct affects
on slum-dwellers. Among other policies, Menem “practically dismantled public housing

45 Auyero, op. cit. (Flammable), p.24.
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policies. In 1992, public investment in housing was 33% less than that in 1980 and 1987.”48
With privatization, jobs are lost and prices increase. With the elimination of subsidies of staples,
prices increase again. At the same time, with a complete reduction in state spending, the poor do
not receive any real support from their government: as commodities get more expensive, they are
helped less.
As discussed in the previous section, villas were already positioned as the temporary
home of migrant workers and those hoping to “make it,” and were therefore easily filled by those
most severely affected by these political changes. Between 2001 and 2002, the unemployment
rate rose 2.3 percentage points to 19.7 percent, and underemployment rose 3.7 percentage points
to 19.3 percent. Simultaneously, real wages in the formal sector decreased by 21 percent, and by
34 percent in the informal sector.49 The setup of villas as an already-established community of
poor and lower-class citizens makes the overwhelmingly negative effects of Menem's presidency
in the 1990s and the economic crisis of 2001 more comprehensible. As the nation soared into
crisis, with over 50 percent of the population under the poverty line, and 22 percent indigent,
villas became the central location, in the urban context, of this poverty.
While Menem's presidency did not end in crisis, neither could the reforms he
implemented be declared a complete success. By the end of the twentieth century, Argentina had
become characterized by “an economy which was opened to fluctuating financial capital, a
deeply indebted state, a production machine in total ruin, high levels of unemployment, an
impoverished and polarised society, and a weak and impotent state”.50 At this point, the negative
effects of the program – as well as its inability to be maintained – were becoming increasingly
48 Auyero, op. cit. (Bronx), p.53.
49 Şenses, op. cit., p.57.
50 Romero, op. cit., p.30.
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obvious, and Menem had let up on many of the extreme reforms that had defined the beginning
of his presidency. In fact, Menem's most rigid reforms were implemented during the first half of
the 1990s. Also, argues Mariana Llanos, the political nature of democracy led to an overall loss
in support of the government and its programs.51
The public no longer backed Menem, and his second term administration was less unified
to effect extreme neoliberal changes. Argentina is a classic case of anti-neoliberal protests: by
the mid-1990s, demonstrations emerged nation-wide, expressing great disapproval of the
reforms. And, unlike protests of the past which were union-led, these were organized by “those
who involuntarily became part of the expanding pool of the long-term unemployed poor” as a
result of the adoption of extreme neoliberalism.52 Javier Auyero writes how:
Sieges of (and attacks on) public buildings (government offices, legislatures,
courthouses), barricades on national and provincial roads, camps in central plazas,
lootings, and … rallies including demands of food from supermarkets became
widespread in the south, center, and north of the country. … [These are] main
examples of the resistance to the implementation and outcomes of neoliberal
adjustment programs.53
The Argentine popular protests show how the nation did not back the government's decision to
take on a neoliberal agenda. The effects of the plan were highly destructive, and Argentines took
to the streets to express their dissatisfaction.
51 Llanos, op. cit.
52 Epstein, Edward. “The Piquetero Movement in Greater Buenos Aires: Political Protests by the Unemployed Poor
During the Crisis.” Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy. Eds. Edward Epstein and David
Pion-Berlin. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006. 95-115. p.98.
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Institutional Weakness. Eds. Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2005. 250-268. p.252.
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By the mid-1990s, the Convertibility Plan was already showing itself as evidently
unsustainable and hugely unpopular with the public, as were the certain and sudden ramifications
of a change from the Plan. At the end of his presidency in 1999, Menem handed to de la Rúa, his
successor, a ticking time bomb: the Convertibility Plan would surely detonate, and the neoliberal
reforms to which it was strongly bound would be of no help when it did. The true nature and
most devastating consequences of Menem's nineties would only be seen after he had left office.
However, from a historical perspective, it is easy now to see that much of the social and
economic turmoil of the past decade can be directly attributed to policies and programs begun in
the 1990s, implemented by the Menem government. While the system did not crash under his
direct watch, it was only a matter of time before it would.

2001/2002 CRISIS
The crash, in fact, came shortly after Menem's departure from office. Fernando de la
Rúa, Menem's successor, was handed a fragile political and economic situation that was clearly
on a path to self-destruction. De la Rúa's first Minister of Economics, José Luis Machinea,
resigned in March of 2001, a foreboding indicator of the coming crash. The replacement,
Ricardo López Murphy, proposed a plan that would require a cut in public spending, and the
generation of a surplus of pesos to meet debt obligations. The social reaction to this proposal
was so strong that De la Rúa fired Murphy within two weeks of appointing him.54 It should be
clarified that it was not just de la Rúa's administration which led to the economic crisis.
Although he was acting chief, and took the lion's share of the blame – it was him, after all, of

54 Schvarzer, op. cit., p.85.
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whom there is the famous shot of a helicopter evacuation from the Casa Rosada –, much of the
situation was already pre-determined by the time he was sworn into office. As Barbeito and
Goldberg write, the “social, political, and economic collapse at the end of 2001 highlighted the
contradictions and the weaknesses of the economic and social regime installed in the 1990s.”55
In some ways, De la Rúa's course as president was already mapped out.
Interestingly enough, for his third financial advisor, de la Rúa chose Cavallo – the “Father
of Convertibility” from Menem's presidency. Under de la Rúa, Cavallo's first action of creating a
subsidy for exports that linked the peso to the euro rather than the dollar showed that he
“indirectly recognized that the exchange rate of the Argentine peso was over-valued.”56 Until
this time, the Convertibility Plan had been maintained, not because it was still believed to be the
best policy, but rather because “no one could think of how the country [could] extricate itself
from it without catastrophic consequences”.57 Events leading up to the crisis foreshadowed its
severity; at a certain point, however, it became the inevitable disaster.
The 2001 crisis came about because structural adjustment policies were not sustainable:
the neoliberal model finally collapsed upon itself. It had the most negative affect on those
already in poverty, yet its affect was not limited to the existing poor: in 2002, over 55 percent of
the populations was below the poverty line.58 Not only was the crisis a result of these policy
changes inwardly collapsing, but also these very same policies had so decreased the safety net
for the public sector that when the system failed, few people were protected against its
destruction. With regard to the villas, and understanding not only the history of these urban areas
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of poverty, but now also of the political impact of the last twenty – and especially ten – years, it
is more clear how these locations have become entrenched in poverty.
With the crisis of 2001/2002, the living conditions of the villas decreased, while the
number of people living in them only increased. The poor, in essence, were doubly crippled by
the outcomes of the crisis, especially as it came at a time when Argentina's government had so
severely cut social welfare spending. Essentially, there was no safety net – rather, there was, it
was simply a poorly maintained net full of holes – when the country's economy crashed. Poverty
rates had already been rising, and this new crisis only added to the increase. While nationwide
people's lives were greatly affected by the crisis, the populations that saw the greatest effects
were those living in villas.

REVIEW OF NEOLIBERALISM
Present literature is replete with critiques and considerations of the neoliberal reforms
taken on by Latin America, renouncing not only the morality and justness of these programs, but
also their very efficacy. While some scholars note the relative efficacy of structural adjustment
politics on Latin American economies, more common is the consensus that neoliberalism was
unnecessarily harmful and useless where it was implemented. It has been shown that
neoliberalism does not aid economy, has set developing countries further behind others, and
further entrenches poverty and inequality. As Huber and Solt write, “More liberalized economies
and more radical reform approaches are associated with higher levels of poverty.”59 In other
words, those who reformed most experience the most damaging effects.
59 Huber, Evelyne, and Fred Solt. “Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism.” Latin American Research Review.
39.3 (2004). 150-164. 156.
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It is now a generally accepted concept that Neoliberalism and the policies through which
it was actualized have had extremely negative impacts on the public. Since the 2001/2002 crisis,
most scholars – even those who had previously been supporters of the reforms – concur that
neoliberal adjustments in Argentina were hugely detrimental to the public sphere – if not to the
growth of the nation, as well. While there is still debate whether it was the policies themselves
that were faulty, or merely their implementation – proponents of the ultimate goodness of the
neoliberal strategy cite the case of Chile, and claim that other failures of the model simply did
not allow enough time for the reforms to take their course – it is resoundingly agreed that the
present situation, incontestably a result of these reforms, is far from what was predicted and
idealized. Neoliberalism has been credited with setting developing countries back in their
economic consolidation, and severely devastating the poor populations of Latin America. It has
even been hailed as an “outright failure.”60
Of course, the argument of Chile's apparently successful experiment with neoliberalism
must be analyzed concurrently with the undeniable fact that the reforms were only implemented
through Pinochet's highly restrictive and severely brutal military dictatorship. Also, perhaps the
best response to the claim of imperfect use or termination before successful completion is that of
Alejandro Portes:
Whenever such incidents occur, supporters of neoliberal adjustment blame them
on its imperfect application or argue for more time for its effects to take hold. But
these justifications only beg the question. If the neoliberal model is properly
applied only where it yields success and is improperly applied where it produces
failure, the argument becomes hopelessly circular. Similarly, the plea for more
60 Fanelli, op. cit., p.23.
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time can become open ended and render impossible the falsification of any
prediction. In Mexico's case, international finance agencies and other advocates
of neoliberal adjustment were hailing its successes until the very moment in which
it came crashing down, thus revealing the “imperfections” of its application.61
Of Argentina, Portes writes that “repeated predictions by economic minister Cavallo about the
end of the fiscal deficit and the arrival of sustained growth came to naught, thus expanding
indefinitely the time horizon for the predicted benefits to materialize”.62 Written in 1997, his
words foreshadowed a fate similar to Mexico's, preceding the 2001/2002 crisis by four years.
Even Michael Walton, former adviser for the World Bank, concedes that, when defined in its
broad sense of state withdrawal from the public sector and rigid dependence on markets,
“neoliberalism is clearly undesirable, and hopelessly incomplete as a development strategy”.63
He goes on to conclude that, while neoliberalism as pertains to valuing “macroeconomic
prudence and a set of market-oriented policies” is a positive and even “an essential part” of a
nation's development, “only with a combination of market-policies, equaling expansion of assets
and influence, and political and social institutional development will Latin American countries
get onto robust paths of rapid and equalizing social and economic advance”.64
Neoliberalism, as a free-market structured economic model dictates that the state remove
itself as much as possible from not only the economic arena of the country, but also from the
public sector. It is not a necessarily new political agenda, nor did its story end with the Latin
American austerity policies of the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, in the last decade, conservative
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lobbyist Grover Norquist has been cited as saying he hopes to reduce government “to the size
where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.” In Argentina, the
combination of this ideology and the creation of and adherence to the Convertibility Plan led to
drastic socio-economic consequences. With the peso unreasonably pegged to the dollar, it was
only a matter of time until the system would collapse. And, when it did, it was not only the poor
who got poorer.
Most important to the poor populations were the subsets of the reforms which cut
government's capacity for social spending. The effects of neoliberalism can be seen in every
study of poverty and unemployment. In 1999, two years before the national economic crisis,
Auyero wrote that, “since the launching of the Menem-Cavallo's 'Convertibility Plan' (1991)
unemployment has increased 200% in Argentina.”65 Certainly it can be assumed that this
number would deepen further in the following two years. In fact, he goes on to write that
“unemployment rates doubled between 1991 and 1994, and doubled again in the 1994-5
period.”66 Clearly, the real results of Menem's neoliberal reforms were not positive, especially
for the working class.
Since the 1960s, Argentina has had one of the biggest middle classes in Latin America.
The crisis of 2001/2002 brought about the phenomenon to be known as the impoverishment of
the middle class. The unsettling reality of the 2001 crisis was that, it was not merely the already
poor who were hurt by economic downturn, though those already in poverty in the time leading
up to the crisis were certainly considerably more affected than any other social class. In fact, of
those classified as poor, 24.7 percent experienced poverty so extremely that they were unable to
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afford adequate food.67 With over 54 percent of the nation's population falling beneath the
poverty line in 2002, however, it is clear that issues of poverty were no longer concerns simply
for the lowest classes; few were spared from the sweeping consequences of the failed economic
project.
Argentina was, at first, “envisaged as the poster child of the Washington Consensus
reforms and the reforms were explicitly supported by multilateral organizations and market
participants.”68 However, “after the demise of the reforms, not only the government's legitimacy
but also that of the international players weakened. It is no wonder that the ensuing government
adopted an anti-reform discourse.”69 It was, in fact, the neoliberal policies implemented by
Menem in the 1990s both brought about the crisis, and also hindered the state from recovering its
public sector.

STATE ABILITY IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION
I have already discussed how neoliberalism calls for the reduction of state spending, and
how this often directly translates into the reduction of social welfare and safety net measures for
the poor. “During the 1990s, the dominant political framework reversed the ascending dynamic
that had characterized the previous stage of maturation of the Argentine WS. Expansion
controlled by favour-for-vote practices eventually gave way to exclusion, either controlled or
not. The result was an anarchic withdrawal of the government from areas in which it had
traditionally played a major role, which led different interest groups to attempt to find individual
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solutions and to secure a specific part of public funding for them.”70 The states ability to finance
social initiatives was reduced by neoliberalism, and this had a direct and obvious affect on those
needing and expecting its help during a time of crisis.
One of the continued legacies of neoliberalism is the general lack of government aid to
the social sector. Neoliberalism as an economic and political strategy calls for minimal
government interference; the increasing poor population, then, is receiving a decreasing amount
of support from the government. At first glance, records show that the under the Convertibility
Plan, government social sector spending actually increased, from 17.1 percent of GDP in 1991 to
22 percent in 2001. However, on further examination, one sees that nearly 40 percent of this
percentage is social insurance spending, the majority of which is financed by its beneficiaries
and not by the government, thus embellishing what the government is actually spending to a
large degree. The increase can also be linked to the fact of an increasing economy: a fact which
is emphasized by the drop in public social spending back to 17.1 percent after the 2001 crisis – a
verification of its “procyclical characteristic”.71
The government has numerous state assistance programs, targeting many different issues
and populations. In fact, in 1998, there were 58 government-funded projects, ranging from work
programs to child health initiatives.72 However, “despite this thematic richness, the low level of
funding combined with the politically manipulated, scattered and inefficient structure of
programs [prevent] them from providing a reliable safety net for the poor”.73 During the crisis,
there was obviously a dramatic increase in the number of poor people and, at the same time, the
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amount spent by the government per poor person after the crisis declined to half of what it had
been in 2001. As far as the international financial institutions that had helped lead the way into
this crisis, they were mostly absent:
It is observed that the BWIs [Bretton Woods Institutions] are not very sensitive to
the matter. Socioeconomic issues are known to be outside the interest areas of
IMF historically. The fund's increasing interest in poverty and inequality that has
recently developed within the context of the so-called Post-Washington Consensus
remained rhetorical and did not transform to effective action.74
The scene immediately following the crisis showed a country suffering the worst economic,
social, and political crisis it had seen, yet with a state that had destroyed any form of safety net
and was unable to stop the most severe consequences.

Clientelism
It would be an untrue and unfair statement to say the government does absolutely nothing
to contribute to the well-being of its public sector, and specifically the poor. As stated above,
there are institutions in place which provide resources to the vulnerable, despite their
unreliability. Another issue that is necessary to understand beyond the number or even the
diversity of the programs when considering government involvement in the social sector is the
methods it used to provide aid. A common trend across Latin America, and in Argentina, as well,
is to have governments develop a client/patron relationship, providing social assistance for direct
political support. In Argentina, the history of this can be traced back to the paternalistic and
“favour-for-vote” manner in which Perón ran his administration in the 40s and 50s. This method
74 Ibid., p.73.
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was key in the development of the villas and the provision of the infrastructure that currently
exists. At the same time, the nature of this clientelistic relationships is also what led so many of
the first villeros to believe that their situation was temporary – that Perón would eventually build
them a new housing solution.
I have already shown that one of the ways that neoliberalism manifests itself through
structural adjustment policies is through harming the poor by means of lack of social welfare
programs. This same set-up of placing the government in the position of restriction on its social
welfare funding creates an atmosphere where clientelism and clientelistic behavior becomes an
easy and beneficial option for the government. In allowing – and promoting – a government
which gives aid nominally and without regulation, the government is given freedom to abuse its
power and treat social spending as an optional humanitarian means for an electoral end.
Auyero discourages the overly simplistic conclusion that poor people are “Pavlovian
agents who vote and support political candidates in exchange for favors and services,” and rather
that we shift our perspective to include the “matrix … that links patrons, brokers, and (some)
'clients' in ongoing problem-solving networks, intricate webs of material and symbolic
resources.”75 He does, however, identify political clientelism as “a form of social and political
control.”76 Auyero characterizes the model of political clientelism as operating with the aid of
three types of actors: clients, brokers, and the political party or specific political actors seeking
public support – caudillos, jefes politicos, or ward bosses. Auyero points out that there is a
intensely complex relationship that almost never is a direct link between the governmental

75 Auyero, Javier. “'From the client's point(s) of view': How poor people perceive and evaluate political
clientelism.” 1999. 301.
76 Auyero, Javier. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account.” Latin American Research
Review. 35.3 (2000): 55-81. p.58.
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parties and their citizens: this network includes such actors as brokers and community middlemen.
One of the concerns of a clientelistic method of governmental social support is that it
delegitimizes the politicians and government. Fanelli discusses the role of clientelism during the
Menem years, saying that Menem “resorted to clientelistic political machineries, which, in turn,
harmed the quality of institutions and eroded the political legitimacy of the whole process.”77
Another way that clientelistic behavior becomes visible is in the structure of the “neighborhood
brokers” as an intermediary between their poor communities and the state. Javier Auyero is one
of the leading researchers in this area, having spent considerable time in Villa Paraíso, another
slum of Buenos Aires, studying the local perspective of the government-community relationship.
He found that the relationship that formed was seldom one explicitly questioned or protested by
the exploited populations. One could argue the case, in fact, that it would be only logical for a
people to vote in accordance to what they are receiving from the parties and/or candidates: it
appears logical for one to vote for the candidate who has offered the most desirable package to
one's community. In fact, one could take it a step further and ask if that is not, in actuality, what
religiously affiliated aid organizations do as well – what separates a political vote from a
religious conversion, and were they not bought through some tangible act or product?

NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES: NGOS?
In this section I have showed how the government, through a series of political and
economic policy decisions, has not only further entrenched the poor in poverty, but has also

77 Fanelli, op. cit., p.5.
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followed certain models that maintain governmental social spending at a minimum. If the
government, then, is not the active agent it needs to be, who or what is taking its place? One of
the possible answers to this question is the presence of non-governmental organizations as
providers of services that are arguably the responsibility of the government. Certainly, the
position in which neoliberalism has left Argentina requires at least some sort of alternative actor.
In the next section, I will introduce and examine several specific NGOs in Buenos Aires that are
working with villa populations.
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3

. CASE STUDIES

I. INTRODUCTION
METHODS
Understanding now how the political and economic histories of Argentina combine to
create an overwhelmingly large and highly concentrated poor population with little access to
governmental support, its seems logical to next seek out the current actors in the situation and
question what they are doing, how, and to what effect. Who are “they,” and why have they
gotten themselves involved? What populations are they serving? What sort of projects are they
initiating? How are they funded? Are they working with help from the government, or
independently? Do they self-identify as replacements for state obligations?
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It was with these questions at the forefront that I conducted my fieldwork in Argentina.
My goal was to study the role of non-governmental organizations in a social sector from which
the state seems very detached. I hoped to better understand the influence of these organizations
in terms of the development in the villa, as well as highlight some of the challenges that they
face.
My research was conducted over the course of six months: from January to July of 2011 I
lived and worked in Buenos Aires, dividing my time between an internship at CARE Argentina78
– an organization that provides after-school support for children in five community centers in
Gran Buenos Aires – and conducting interviews with directors, founders, and presidents of
comparable organizations. In order to narrow the study and be able to make sound comparisons
and conclusions, I limited my focus to organizations that work specifically with villa children or
issues of education. However, it should be mentioned that some of the organizations that I have
included – like CARE, Voluntario Internacional, Asociación La Madrugada, and Fundación Las
Aulas – also have operations outside of Greater Buenos Aires79, which I will not be including as
part of the assessment, as those details do not add to a discussion of non-governmental solutions
to urban poverty.
With CARE, I divided my time between office work and in-field activities, gaining
experience with the administrative side of the non-profit, and also a familiarity with the
communities and individuals with which it operates. In the office, I my duties included receiving
and replying to all of CARE's emails, mostly from future volunteers and interns; leading the
orientation sessions for new volunteers; and being part of a “research and marketing” team. The
78 Names of organizations and individuals have been changed.

79 In CARE's case, this is a monthly excursion to Misiones a northern province of Argentina, where volunteers
spend three days working with a rural jungle village.
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research team was responsible for looking into new avenues of funding, finding contacts for
volunteers, and advertising CARE's projects online – through this I not only learned the financial
and marketing aspect of CARE, I experienced and participated in it. Similarly, with the task of
presenting the orientations three time weekly, I had to explain, repeatedly, the various aspects of
CARE and our role in the communities in a comprehensive manner. Being a part of the team in
such an integral way was key as I developed an understanding of how CARE – and other
organizations like it – functions.
As an intern, I was also a site-coordinator and was at first in charge of an activity site in
the villa Ciudad Oculta. In March I transferred to Gregorio de Laferrere, a site further from the
city, where I stayed until the end of my time in Argentina. While I worked primarily with the
children and community in Laferrere, I was one of the few long-term interns, and therefore
remained a coordinator that frequently traveled between sites. When CARE added two locations
– paradores downtown – I was one of the coordinators to help establish the new relationships.
However, my principle responsibility remained in Laferrere, where my duties were to prepare the
children's activities each day, be a constant intermediary between our contact at Laferrere and the
office, and facilitate the experience of the CARE volunteers – from their arrival at the office to
the transport between the city and our activity site, and then back to the city center. This
experience, as with being part of the administrative aspects, gave me a deep understanding of
how an organization like CARE operates on the ground. The perspective I gained from my
internship was monumentally beneficial because it gave me a fundamental knowledge of an
NGO in Buenos Aires, as well as a basis from which I could identify characteristics and patterns
in the organizations I interviewed.
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If the fieldwork in Laferrere and Ciudad Oculta, coupled with continued experience in a
managerial position at CARE, offered me an understanding of one organization's operations, then
the interviews with directors of similar NGOs gave me a broader perspective of the range of
programs that exist. While I worked to limit my selection to organizations with similar goals and
target communities, there was still great diversity in the scope of my sample. In total, I
interviewed 19 social organizations. This analysis, though, only highlights the twelve that either
work specifically with children, within villa communities, or give insight on the concept of
international volunteerism, excluding others whose focus is more on research, adults, or in
located in mainly rural regions of the outer-lying provinces. The organizations I spoke with
showed a wide range of practice in project methodology, volunteer dynamics, and source of
funding. In fact, of the twelve organizations included in this analysis, two are based in Gran
Buenos Aires, ten are in Buenos Aires capital; five have operations or partners in other provinces
of the country; three were founded by non-Argentines; ten are still directed by their original
founders; one is a community cooperative that operates locally with individuals and families of
the neighborhood; and one is a national organization that works with school systems and smaller
NGOs to carry out ts projects. This heterogeneity of the group gives breadth to the study by
showing multiple approaches to the same social issues.
I develop this chapter in three sections, with a short preface for definitional clarity.
Because of the inter-cultural – and, more imporantly, inter-linguistic – nature of this study, there
are a few concepts that I do not want lost in translation, as well as others that are simply too
broad and require some grounding definitions before I launch into any case analyses. The first
main section will then serve as a basic introduction of the twelve organizations that I
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interviewed. In this, I discuss the fundamentals of each organization: its history and founder
information, mission statement, structure, and the demographics of the organization's target
communities. Most importantly, this first section gives the basis from which I draw analyses
further in the paper. In the next section, I identify, compare, and contrast key structural elements
by which the organizations have been formed. These elements include organizational
characteristics like location, source of funding, and to what extent each collaborates with other
organizations. In the third and final section, I develop more nuanced trends of the organizations
in the same manner. Like the previous section, this will be a comparison among the twelve
organizations, though on more abstract themes that presented themselves in my fieldwork, like
how culture affects organizational structure, perspectives of the government, and the contrast
between “help” and “poverty tourism.”

ESSENTIAL DEFINITIONS
Before introducing and examining specific organizations and their projects, there are a
few terms whose definitions need clarifying. They range from philosophical and reflective
concepts to more basic and even location-specific terms.
If what I am attempting to undertake is to observe effectiveness in social organizations, a
necessary prerequisite is to first establish the grounds on which this effectiveness will be based.
Determining definitions of ideas like “needs,” “efficacy,” and “help,”80 assist in interpreting the
actions and programs of social organizations. From my experience with both organizational

80

I will further explore this idea of “help” in the section analyzing trends, as it plays a large part of
determining the subcultures present in the organizations with which I worked. However, the looseness with which
we use the concept of need and effective must be reduced.
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leaders and villa dwellers – though, too, simply from having intuitively observed and interacted
with people of all backgrounds –, I believe it reasonable to open up the concept of “need” from
meaning solely a physical necessity. That is, it may be useful to look at “needs” not merely as
what an individual physically must have for survival, but also as what conditions may be
necessary for autonomy and self-betterment. Likewise, “help” cannot be considered simply a
hand-out, or a process quantitatively measured. Rather, it requires a long-term perspective of
what the action is accomplishing for the individual or community in the span of their lives, with
the ultimate goal being their ability to cease “needing” such “help.” “Efficacy” then, would be
the ability of a program to see needs neither as constant nor as purely physical, but as transitional
and fluid, and to meet these needs with a variety of of methods that cater to the targeted
community's situation.
The other definitions that are needed for the subsequent analyses are much more
elementary in nature. There are some instances in the following evaluations when a Spanish
word is preferred over its English equivalent, because the direct translation conveys a
connotation that does not accurately portray the word's function in Spanish. Culture is important
in shaping language: there are words that, literally translated, do not carry their original meaning
in their cultural context.
Its history already discussed at some length, the villa is a prime example of this type of
cultural and linguistic variation. Despite having presented the definition of these poor
neighborhoods as slums and shantytowns in the previous section, I still prefer to refer to them as
villas, for there is a set of cultural and societal constructs in Argentina that accompany the term
villa. There is a particular attitude, shared by most porteños, of the dirty and dangerous villa,
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which is to be “feared and avoided,”81 as Auyero notes. It is a stigma that permeates culture to
such an extent that there are actual lines between where the “proper” city ends, and the villa
begins. In the case of Ciudad Oculta, this is a brick wall built around the villa in 1978 by the
government to hide the slum from press visiting for the World Cup. It has since been reduced to
rubble, yet still is a notable reminder of the separateness of the two realities. The stigma
transfers easily from the locational villa to the more personal villero, or someone who lives in or
is from a villa. The popular disposition is to view villeros as “the others,” and socially worth less
than those from the “right side” of the villa line. Because of this highly prejudicial view, there is
a distinctly negative undertone to the term villero. Though it is not necessarily a slur, it is
typically a descriptor, and almost never a term of self-identification.
The term porteño refers to any person living in – and originally from – Buenos Aires, and
comes with a great set of its own cultural baggage and biases. There is an entire literature on the
subculture of the porteño, and the extent to which it simultaneously encompasses and is removed
from general Argentine culture. For the porteños themselves, the label is worn with pride; for
those from anywhere outside of the city's limits, or “las afueras,” the term is said with slight
scorn. Regardless of one's personal opinions, though, the term does its job to indicate that
something is from Buenos Aires. At the same time, the specification aids this study, for I found
no villeros living within the capital's limits who also self-identify as porteños; nor did I talk to
any porteños who would consider themselves to be in the same group as somebody from a villa.
This adds a class dynamic to the cultural quality of porteño, and allows a way to distinguish
between the levels of “from Buenos Aires.” It is more specific than simply bonarense, which
could refer to anything from Buenos Aires, city or province.
81 Auyero, op. cit. (Flammable), p.22.
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Another word that will appear frequently in this study is comedor. While often translated
as a “soup kitchen,” the way it operates is actually much different than how one experiences
those kind of centers in North America, or a similar culture. Comedores in Argentina are places
that give meals to a specific community and are typically fully or partially funded by the
government. That being said, nothing is absolutely uniform about comedores: there are
comedores that are free-standing entities, others that are run from a family's personal kitchen,
and still others that are a combination of the two, where a family lives in a small space above an
industrial kitchen. Usually they are operated by individuals of the community they serve. In a
community where a comedor is needed, a petition is made to the municipal government and,
after a fairly arduous bureaucratic process, they are provided with funds to open and operate.
Sometimes the food itself is allocated to the comedores each month; another system the
government employs is to provide the comedor operator with a “food card” - similar to a credit
card, it can be used to purchase specific food items the comedor needs. Even the service
provided by a comedor varies by location: some offer full meals, others only lunch or dinner, and
still others simply the afternoon merienda – an afternoon snack, generally tea and bread or a
pastry between three and five o'clock. However, the commonality between all comedores is that
they exist in communities of high poverty and offer physical relief to those lacking food and/or
access to food.
A problem with comedores is that they tend to create hierarchies and sub-channels of
intra-community clientelism. Operators of comedores typically fill the role Javier Auyero
describes as “brokers”: they are the individuals filling the gap between the poor people and the
government agents. They serve as a middle man, and often are solely responsible for enforcing
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who gets what, and when. Whereas some comedores are open to the general public82, others
only supply food to a certain population within the grid of the villa and, as I found in one case,
sometimes ethnicity or even familial prejudices can be factors of “selection.” The list of those
who do – and do not – get to eat at the comedor is often decided by the individuals who run it.
This undoubtedly gives a significant amount of power in the barrio, or neighborhood, to those
who run comedores.
A parador (literally, a stop-over) is a sort of refuge for people in extremely vulnerable
situations. In fact, they are also referred to simply as refugios, and are seen as places of last
resort. Paradores that offer free housing at night, a warm place to pass the day for those who
spend their nights on the street, and sometimes meals during the day, depending on the location.
Many designate that they are specifically open to only men, or only women and children, and
most have limited space for overnight guests. Typically paradores are located in more central
areas of the city, and target a population very different from comedores and other organizations
working in villas: these are specifically for the homeless, or those in a transitory state of extreme
vulnerability. It is important to see the difference between a parador and a comedor in a villa.
An example of this dissimilarity – and also of the pronounced stigma of the villa – is a discussion
I had a middle-age mother at a parador in downtown Buenos Aires, when I mentioned that one of
my other activity sites was in Ciudad Oculta. “No!” she exclaimed, her eyes widening, horrified.
“I wouldn't ever go there – it isn't safe!” This, from a woman passing the daytime in a parador,

82Vivimos Juntos, one of the organizations I interviewed, had operated one such “open-door” comedor for a few
years, serving anyone who wanted to come, yet closed down due to the extensive work involved in preparing,
serving, and cleaning up after the meals of an ever-changing group of people. The woman who had been in
charge of the kitchen told me that the people “were not respectful … not grateful … they would always leave a
mess, and they would check around [at other comedores] to know what we … and others … were serving, before
deciding to eat here. We weren't a restaurant!”
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waiting for a hot meal, and nights alone with her four year old daughter in the street.
Even the term “non-governmental organization” – the very premise of this study – is
overly large and can seem a daunting task to break down. However, one of the directors I
interviewed showed the need to give it clarity when he objected to my labeling of his and all of
my other interviewing organizations as NGOs. His reason was that one does not define anything
else by its negative. “You,” he said to example his point, “would not identify yourself as a notman; rather, you are a woman.” He concludes that it is best to classify these organizations as
social rather than non-governmental. I agree that NGO has the potential to be misleading
because its scope is entirely too broad, and leads to little comprehension about the organization
itself. Social organization, however, hardly gives more narrow a description, though it does
reverse the label from being one of negative definition. His concern, though, is legitimate, and I
make my best effort to regard each project, organization, and initiative as it self-identifies, rather
than as a part of an arbitrary grouping.

II. INTRODUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS
CARE Argentina83 began as a small project started by an Argentine woman named Rosa,
and is now one of the organizations receiving the most international volunteers in Buenos Aires.
Rosa has been involved with social work all her life, and the economic, social, and political crisis
of 2001 spurred her to organize something concrete from which to organize her projects.
Although CARE was not officially registered until 2005, Rosa began laying the foundations of

83 As previously stated, names of organizations have been changed. The organization and its projects, described
here under the name “CARE,” have no relation to the international humanitarian agency CARE, whose mission
is to fight global poverty.
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the organization in 2001. The plan was simple enough: give villa children what they would not
have otherwise. With the intent to “let kids be kids,” and to provide a safe space to experience
the simple joys of childhood, Rosa began going into Ciudad Oculta, one of Buenos Aires' largest
villas, to throw birthday parties with her own children and close friends as her team. Her initial
purpose hinges on an important concept: children in the villa grow up tremendously fast. At the
age of 12 and 13, many are already the caretakers of younger siblings and are facing life
decisions of dropping out or of graduating secondary; having sex and, potentially, children of
their own; and using and dealing paco, an extremely addictive drug. Anyone, then, that gives
them the space to safely be children—to play fútbol, or color, or read a book, or just to hand off
their baby sister or brother to a volunteer for two hours—is incredibly relevant to these children.
This was the function that Rosa intended CARE to have as she started the birthday project, and
although the organization has grown to include more than just parties, this mission runs true to
the core of the what CARE still is.
Over time, Rosa and her children began networking with organizations and universities in
North America and Europe, recruiting volunteers and financial support, and CARE grew to be
known as an organization that welcomed internationals with open arms. As the volume of
volunteers grew, so did the ability to expand the projects. In 2005 the office in Recoleta was
rented to house the organization's institutional activities, which were needed to fully operate all
the projects. Organizationally, CARE is composed of the founders, interns, and volunteers.
Rosa, the founder, works at the managerial level together with her son, Darian, and daughter,
Ramona. At any given time, there are between three and eight interns, all foreigners. It is typical
to have the flux of interns follow the pattern of a northern hemisphere university schedule. The
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interns all work both in the office and as site-coordinators. They stay for a minimum of two
months, with the longest term I knew staying one year. Interns are responsible for behind-thescenes functionality of the office, the orientation of new volunteers, and the preparations of the
daily activities for the kids.
Currently, there are four regular components to CARE's work in the capital: after-school
workshops, monthly photography workshops, play workshops and, of course, birthday parties.
CARE has five activity sites at either full or partial comedores, four of which are in Ciudad
Oculta, or Villa 15. The fifth is in Gregorio de Laferrere, which is neither a villa nor in the city
itself. School support is held twice a week at each site, and birthday parties are held every
Wednesday, on a rotation schedule between the sites so that each month all the children whose
birthdays were that month are celebrated.
The main project of CARE is called “School Support,” and is an educational after-school
activity for children that both gives them access to college-aged students as personal tutors and
serves the practical purpose of physically taking them off the streets for a few hours each week.
For two days a week, the children are with CARE in the time between getting out of school and
eating dinner – time that would have been spent on the street. Instead, they work with the
volunteers on either homework they have brought or, more often, on worksheets provided by
CARE. One of the initiatives recently started is an incentive system by which the children
complete their worksheets. In it, the site-coordinator creates a carpeta, or folder, for each child,
into which he or she places the completed work of that chid. All work done is recorded, and
there is a system of stickers and prizes to encourage the children in their progress. The carpetas
have turned out to hold two benefits beyond simply knowing what the child has or has not
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completed. The first is that site-coordinators can begin to pre-plan the work for each child,
giving out individualized worksheets and homework; the second is the overwhelmingly positive
reaction of the kids: they love to have a carpeta that is theirs – many kids paste their prize
stickers on the folder itself. Having something that has their name on it, and is so uniquely their
own is, for most children, something novel. This, though not the main objective of the system, is
certainly one of the most positive direct results.
Photography workshops are a monthly initiative that give the older children an
opportunity to go into the city with the volunteers for a day of taking pictures in some of the
scenic and touristy areas of the capital. Any volunteers participating that day lend their cameras
to the kids for the afternoon, and often each camera is shared between two or three kids. This
day is a really exceptional one for the kids. The obvious reason is that they get to visit parts of
their city that they may have never seen, spend relaxed time one-on-one with volunteers and
interns, and can be creative with their photos. However, from a sociological perspective, this is
also a really important day for the children, also: like the after school activities, the photography
workshops get the children off the streets – even more importantly, out of the villa completely –
for an entire day. Beyond this, though, the most valuable aspect of photography Saturdays may
be the exchange of cameras. Each child is handed the personal camera of a foreigner, with a
message they very rarely hear: one of trust. For Rosa's goal of letting villa kids know that they
are normal, this statement is key: they are not distrusted simply because they come from a villa.
Indeed, there is a discernible boost of confidence and self-esteem in every child as they hold
their borrowed cameras.
Play workshops generally happen only in the summer for the regular programs or during
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holidays, following the kids' school schedule. The recent addition of two parador locations,
however, have made play workshops a year-round activity. Typically these range from lightly
educational games of matching and puzzles to coloring, jump rope, and card games. Similar to
play workshops, CARE also does occasional special event days for Christmas, Easter, Kids' Day
in August, and sometimes on the request of visiting volunteer groups. Also, in the late summer
before school stars, school supplies are given to all of the children and, at the same time, the
children receive a pair of shoes, as CARE works with an international shoe company that
operates a global “one-for-one” aid project that donates one pair of shoes to a needy child for
every pair sold.
Finally, despite the organization's growth and with the addition of many people and
projects in the last ten years, birthday parties remain a special and untouched aspect of the
program. Each child is still given an individualized gift, there are fanciful decorations, and
specially decorated boys' and girls' cakes. For Rosa, this remains one of the most important
things: that the children of the villas be seen the same as children anywhere, with the same hopes
and wants – and that they be treated as such, regardless of their socio-economic status. Birthday
parties are special: they recognize the individual child as significant, and this is the message that
Rosa wants each child to hear.
However, these special touches add cost. While CARE is primarily an action-based
organization that relies on volunteers' donation of time, even projects centered on less tangible
needs of kids also occasionally and necessarily deal with the physical and practical ones, and add
operational costs. The school supplies in the fall; gifts on Christmas, Kids' day, and birthdays;
food during special events; and the daily merienda are all extra costs the organization's projects
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incur. While many items are donated to CARE by local businesses, CARE also charges a fee to
all of its incoming volunteers, and requires that each be responsible for the cost of the trips to
and from the villa – a decision that is highly contested among the NGO leaders with whom I
spoke. Rosa does not, however, receive any money from the state, and views government
financial aid to NGOs very poorly, claiming that it will then attempt to control the organization's
actions.
Rosa's goal for the future is to expand the organization enough to be able to run activities
to each of the activity sites every day of the school week – and action that would increase the
number of activities by over 100 percent. The idea of moving the office to a neighborhood
closer to villa has been discussed in staff meetings, though this would man an almost certain
drop in foreign volunteers, as many feel comfortable coming to CARE only because of its office
location in such a known part of town. The future of CARE is not yet certain, though expansion
is definitely on Rosa's mind.

Alianza de las Madres del Barrio San Rafael is a small, community-based initiative,
founded over ten years ago by Filomena and Nadia, two women from the neighborhood San
Rafael. My knowledge of Alianza del Barrio San Rafael comes predominantly through CARE
Argentina, as one of our after-school sites – in fact, the one I myself coordinated – was located in
the courtyard of Filomena's home, and Alianza's “office.” Through this continual contact and
informal conversation with Filomena, her husband Sergio, and the co-founder, Nadia, my
understanding of this organization runs deeper than that of the other interviewed organizations.
Although the other CARE activity sites are also located in small community centers like Alianza,
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I did not gain the familiarity with them as with Alianza, and so they are not included in this
study. However, it should be assumed that community cooperatives like this one exist in
abundance. Because they are much smaller than CARE and other internationally-known NGOs,
they often seem more hidden to outsiders. Indeed, had I not worked with Filomena directly, I
would never have known of her or her cooperative – she has no presence online or in any
network within the city.
Located in Gregorio de Laferrere, a town just outside of Buenos Aires Capital, in the
province of Buenos Aires, the kind of poverty and needs that the community of San Rafael faces
are different from those in the villa. Poverty in Laferrere is more rural than in the villa. The
roads are wider, houses larger, and families may even have space for a small garden. However,
cars are even more rare than in the villa; it is not uncommon to see horses grazing in the street,
tethered to their owners' doors. The roads are dustier and more prone to flooding, especially
after a big rain, but constantly with spillover sewage. While space may be in greater supply in
Laferrere, residents of the area are more disconnected than villeros – from jobs, and the
infrastructure that a large city provides. The school system, too, though certainly of poor quality
in the villas, worsens still as one travels further out of the city. For my orientations with new
volunteers, I would often explain the difference between Laferrere and the villa sites in visual
terms: wheras poverty in the villa is black and grey, loud and “in your face,” in outer-lying towns
like Laferrere, it is brown and beige, silent and bleak.
Alianza de Las Madres is much smaller than the other NGOs I interviewed, as it is
principally a coming-together of neighbors in an act of solidarity, rather than an outside
organization reaching in to a poor community. In 2000, organizers of a regional political
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meeting, brought up the need for community organization to provide for neighborhood welfare,
and Filomena and a few of her friends volunteered to head the initiative. “We didn't know what
we were doing, but... we did all the paperwork, and they sent us a little money,” she says. The
small group of neighborhood mothers, headed by Filomena – a mother and grandmother herself
–, now works to provide about 60 neighborhood children and an equal number of elderly with
resources and services. Partnering with local churches and organizations like CARE, Alianza is
able to provide winter jackets and clothing, after-school support, and even health clinics,
massages, and yoga classes once a week. Although Alianza had what Filomena calls “political
beginnings,” due to its formation as a result of the political meetings, it has transitioned into
purely being a social organization, concerned with the welfare of the community, specifically the
children and the elderly.
Moving toward the future, Filomena is hoping to expand and to be able to spatially
support a comedor for the neighborhood, among other activities. She has her sights set on “la
quinta,” a small plot of land diagonally across from her house. Her current space hardly has
room for the activities already being provided, and much less to become a place to cook for and
feed a neighborhood. She says, “I would love to have a place where the kids could play fútbol,
and not be in the streets … it isn't safe there.” Attaining this space, however, would require
outside help that Filomena has not found yet. Alianza receives donations of time, clothing, or of
programs themselves, but not a great deal of monetary support. For this reason, Filomena says
that their little association is largely “self-made,” without help “from anybody, from anywhere.”

Asociación Civil la Madrugada, a not-for-profit organization founded in 1999, works
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with children and youth in “maximum situations of social infringement” to facilitate both social
integration as well as reintegration into work, school, and family life. Andrés, the founder, is
educated as a lawyer, though his passion is first and foremost theater. In law school, he started a
drama club that quickly became controversial, because he would frequently call on street kids
washing cars to play parts in his cast—revealing his other passion, which is social inclusion of
those often marginalized. “It has always been my purpose,” he states, “to include the kids... to
cut down the walls that exist.” Now, as the head of a social organization that works with
marginalized kids through art and social projects, as well as providing legal and educational
support, Andrés has found a way to integrate his formal training with his social agenda.
Considering himself to be a “director from the field” rather than a “director from the
desk,” Andrés does his best to be wherever he is needed – whenever he is needed. And, with 380
enrolled kids each month in programs reaching beyond the city limits of Buenos Aires capital,
that goal can often prove difficult. He says that his organization is “apolitical, areligious,
a...everything, only in favor of the kids.” The work Asociación La Madrugada does with kids
covers a wide range of activities: while largely focused on drama and theatre, giving youth an
artistic way to express themselves and build relationships, La Madrugada also has workshops
directed towards understanding rights and learning about educational and career options. The
organization's goal is to attain “social integration by way of the arts, with firm roots in rights.”
The “arts,” – the dramas that the kids are involved with – let the kids be part of something bigger
than themselves. They create the play, produce it, and watch it grow – this process not only
builds relationships between all involved, it also gives the youth involved a distinct sense of
accomplishment and achievement – “a vital key,” says Andrés, “to them ever becoming a part of

60

the larger society.” The “rights” aspect of La Madrugada's mission statement is found in the
classes offered by volunteers. These range from English and computer literacy programs to the
availability of lawyers to talk to. It is important to Andrés that the youth he works with know
that they have a voice and that there are professionals who are willing to hear them.
Asociación La Madrugada receives heavy funding from the government – municipal,
provincial, and national – which provides the resources needed to operate multiple projects, keep
a staff of 30 paid employees, and maintain the downtown office and an organizational van.
Andrés says that the government monitors how its money is being spent, yet that this control is
necessary and good: “the government should control the NGOs.” He states that since 1983 (the
year of Argentina's transition to political democracy), the government has been “present
enough,” and he is glad for its support, as La Madrugada would not function as it does without it.

Asociación Crecer is an organization that works with women and their children, teaching
healthy lifestyle choices, infant and childhood malnutrition prevention, and other skills like
sewing or gardening. Unlike most of the other organizations I worked with, Asociación Crecer is
not directly in Buenos Aires capital. Located in Morón, an hour bus ride outside of the city
center, it serves the population of Villa Morón, an official villa of Gran Buenos Aires. The
organization's center is within walking distance of the homes of the families with which it works
and for Marcela, the director, this proximity constitutes one the best parts of her organization. In
fact, she says that this ought be the goal of any social initiative: to seek out the needs of the
community within which it works, and then make efforts to meets those specific needs. If all
organizations did this, she says, the system of help would be so much more effective.
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This project is part of the larger network Red Salud Familiar, which was founded in Chile
and preoccupies itself mainly with issues of childhood health and nutrition. Asociación Crecer's
main project is a year long program for families – specifically mothers and their children – of the
neighboring villa. Those enrolled attend daily workshops, classes, and counseling sessions,
graduating from the program with new skills and resources. The classes and workshops range
from sewing tutorials to informational classes on diet and nutrition, and there are trained
psychologists and social works available to talk with the women as part of the counseling
initiative. At the center, whenever the women are in their classes, there is someone who watches
their children and leads them in art or play projects.
Starting with just 12 families enrolled the first year, Asociación Crecer is now up to 60
participating families. The organization operates through volunteers, university interns, and 10
paid employees, and is funded primarily through donations from individuals and local
businesses. Another way that the project is funded is through occasional government por
proyecto grants, or one-time awards that allocate a certain amount of money to an organization
for a specific project or program. This government aid is helpful, says Marcela, yet so much
more is necessary for effective change, and not just in terms of a government project
transformation. Looking forward, Marcela hopes that more projects will take time to learn a
community's needs, without “just doing for the sake of doing.” The key, she says, is to work in
partnership with other organizations.

Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro is, first and foremost, a play-space. Even the office
emits a message of fun. A tiny storage room converted into usable space in the back of an mid-
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19th century building several blocks out of the financial district, the workspace has two rooms:
the first, a brightly painted area with a blue wooden table and two multi-colored chairs; the
second contains a few computers and more floor space for the coordinators to practice games. In
the room with the table, there are hula hoops hanging from hooks on the wall, big rubber balls on
a shelf, board games neatly stacked in a corner, and bins of toys, each clearly marked with its
contents.
Founded in 2005 by a woman named Florencia, Déjelos Venir Adentro is based on the
concept that play is important, and that all children deserve the opportunity to safe play time and
space. Florencia, a translator, has always been involved with NGOs, and found herself
fascinated by the psychology of play as she volunteered with organizations that specifically work
with children. Looking for a volunteer opportunity for herself and her children, she made
contact with a community project who told her that what they needed most was a juegoteca, or
an organized play workshop. Thus the organization was born.
Now, Déjelos Venir Adentro has five paid employees – four coordinators and one general
managing coordinator –, and four activity sites: two with community centers and two in schools,
working with the school system to provide a “play” class period. This project differs from the
majority of the other organizations in that it does not work in a villa. Rather, the “play projects”
are targeted to schoolchildren of low income neighborhoods, but not those of the villa. Florencia
describes this decision as one made from concerns “...of safety... I was going with my children,
and I just don't want to have to take them there... I won't say never, but for now, we don't go into
those places.”
Currently, Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro is financed primarily through private
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donations and government “por proyecto” money, which often goes towards the purchase of new
toys. In the future, Florencia hopes to grow Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro so that it is
completely self-sustaining. She wants to develop the “Play Program” into a marketable
curriculum that she could then sell to schools in wealthy neighborhoods like Palermo and
Recoleta which would, in effect, finance the primary function of the organization: to continue to
provide safe play spaces for children in poor and marginalized neighborhoods. “The
organization,” she says, is currently at capacity. “The coordinators we have cannot handle any
more activities, and our budget does not allow for any more coordinators.”

Fundación Las Aulas is an organization that works on a macro-level across Argentina to
promote education and healthy learning environments. Whereas most of the organizations of this
analysis are community-based, Fundación Las Aulas works with schools and smaller
organizations nation-wide to effect change in the education system. While the organization's
methods are different, though, its goals are undoubtedly aligned to those of even the smallest
local initiatives that provide personal tutorship and individual homework help. The foundation
has many different projects that it runs, ranging from student sponsorship to a new initiative
which gives scholarships to post-secondary students pursuing a career in education, on the
condition that they stay in their home communities to give back, once they have completed their
schooling. Student sponsorship is based on anonymous donors who give money each month or
year to be the personal sponsor of a child's school needs.
One of the most creative aspects of Fundación las Aulas is that it is partially funded by a
parking lot that it owns in the city center. While 50 percent of the revenue returns to the
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maintenance of the lot itself, the other half goes to the operational costs of running the
organization. This is where the salaries of the four paid employees is created, as well as the
other institutional costs, like the rent for the office space, electricity, or phone bills. Because of
this creative funding solution, donors are guaranteed that 100 percent of their money goes to the
project or child for which it is intended. As the stress of finding funding for administrative costs
is reduced, the organization is free to let the donors fund solely the projects and, as director
Santiago says, “our greatest resource is our volunteers.”

Hogar de Fernando is an artistically-driven social initiative started in 2007 by Claire, a
French woman who relocated to Buenos Aires. With the idea of “giving the children the concept
that there exists something within them that is different—special,” Claire works to create an
environment in which children are able to express their feelings without restraint through art:
music, dance, paint, poetry, and drawing. Her after-school project does not have its own
building; instead, the group borrows the upstairs space of a local fire department in La Boca, an
area not far from downtown, which is simultaneously a large tourist magnet frequented by many
foreigners, as well as a very poor slum neighborhood. Wednesday through Saturday, Claire and
her volunteers meet with the children and work solely on creative projects. She says: “We don't
look for the artist in the child, we only look for the art to be a way to touch something in the
child... that they may express their creativity, and also their worry. Their fears. What's bothering
them.”
Institutionally, Hogar de Fernando is made up entirely of volunteers. Many of the
specifically-trained teachers are actually specialists or professionals who give a few hours a
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week to work with the kids. For example, the children's guitar instructor is a middle-age
musician who has recorded a couple of CDs and spends the days that he is not with Hogar de
Fernando giving paid private lessons. One of the unique aspects of Hogar de Fernando is that it
strives to be sensitive to the emotional and psychological needs of not only the children but also
of the team of adults that work with them, as well. The pain and struggles that children learn to
accept as normal can be overwhelming for the volunteer; especially when they come to view the
adult as a mentor and confidant. Often times the intensity of what one deals with when working
with these kids is ignored; Claire hopes to have her team know they, too, are listened to and
cared for. As Claire has maintained strong connections with her contacts in France, the
organization receives most of its funding from French companies. In fact, all of the
organization's money comes from individuals and groups, whether Argentine or foreign, with no
help whatsoever from state or church agents.

Luz Creciente is a comedor and community center located in Bajo Flores, which is the
southern part of Flores, a neighborhood in south-central Buenos Aires. Bajo Flores contains
Villa 1-11-14, which is inhabited mostly by Peruvian, Bolivian, and Paraguayan immigrants. In
addition to the meals it provides the community as a comedor, Luz Creciente also offers afterschool activities and school support for children; workshops on family violence, victim defense,
childcare, and computer literacy; temporary housing for disabled, homeless, or battered women
and their children; and is a provider of work for women of Villa 1-11-14, at the on-site bakery,
pasta factory, daycare and, of course, the comedor itself. Delia, the founder, is a nurse who
began this project over ten years ago by helping nine children who had been abandoned by their
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mother on her street. As the number of children coming to her for assistance grew, so did the
number of friends and acquaintances who were willing to help her and, in 1998, Delia
established their actions as the organization Luz Creciente. She found a building to operate out
of and expanded the projects to include adult women seeking work, classes, or simply an escape
form domestic abuse.
Located on the line dividing the villa from the rest of the neighborhood, the center works
with women and children living literally across the street. The goal of the organization from the
beginning, says Delia, was to “give the children school support, a place of self control and
assistance, so that they will go to school.” Then, in 2001, “with everything happening in the
economy, we had to start feeding them,” and Luz Creciente transitioned into being a comedor
also. Now, ten years later, the comedor is still an integral part of the organization, which has
expanded into a warehouse next door to the office as well as a small building further down the
block. Nearly 700 people are fed three times a day, for lunch, merienda, and supper.
The program focuses on women and children from Villa 1-11-14, and provides a place for
women to work, children to study, and all to attend workshops and classes. The center is a safe
place for women to go when they have no other option; those who are disabled, homeless, or are
escaping abusive home situations find a temporary haven at Luz Creciente. Delia's dream for the
future is to have a 24-hour call center, which women could call seeking help in abusive
situations. She says there is a government alternative to this, but it is backed up by nothing –
women who call the line are not given the aid they need, and must simply wait in the situation
they are in. Her plan is to provide this call center that would operate from Luz Creciente, so that
women could be provided real solutions right away. However, to move forward at all, “we need
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resources, we can't do anything with nothing,” says Delia.

Ñasaindy ONG84 is a new organization established just this year by a group of university
students and young professionals. What began as student volunteering in a villa has developed
into a long-term project with high ambitions. A mission group called Grupo Ñasaindy began
volunteering with children in Villa 21 three years ago, mostly with the objective of playing and
having fun with the kids. Over time, they realized that there was a need in this community that
they, realistically, could fill. They decided to register as an official organization and continue
their work with the help of donors, and in a more inclusive way than as just an informal student
organization. One of the keys to the easy transition from mission group to NGO was that they
kept the same name. The Guaraní word, meaning “light of the moon,” carries personal
significance to a few of the team members and, as they work in a primarily Paraguayan area of
the villa, the community was receptive of it as well. Already the children and their families had
been familiar with the students as Grupo Ñasaindy for three years, and Ñasaindy ONG was not a
far step from this, and so the organization began with already strong community relationships.
Ñasaindy's ultimate goal is to have families no longer need social programs at all; to rely
on their own resources and be autonomous family units. Their plan to achieve this is divided
into two individual projects: educative and familial. In the first, there are four basic pillars on
which they base the activities: diet (providing breakfast and lunch on activity days), school help,
info-sessions, and scheduled play time. With the family project, there are six aspects taken into

84 ONG stands for organización no gubernamental, or non governmental organization. This is the only
organization I spoke with who had NGO as such an advertised part of their identity. Indeed, it is quite a different
stance from the director who took offense at the term, insisting that his organization be referred to only as a
social organization.
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consideration: legal, health, education, work, cultural promotion, and housing. Martín, one of
the directors of the program, talks about the two projects as a comprehensive package that works
with all aspects of family and individual growth. He stresses how important education is for the
goal of making the organization's role obsolete – through gaining skills and resources, families
will be able to become independent and no longer rely on any organization.
Institutionally, Ñasaindy ONG is still figuring out how it will operate best, as it has so
recently transitioned to being an official organization. At the time of the interview, there were
eight paid employees and three volunteers working on an administrative level. One of the
aspects that sets Ñasaindy apart from other organizations is how youth-centered it is. Not only is
the organization young because of how recently it has been established, but also because of the
ages of the founders, volunteers, and employees: all are either young professionals, recent
university graduates, or still in school. This absolutely shapes how the organization is run, and
what importance is placed on various projects. In my discussion with Martín, our conversation
quickly turned to academic themes in a way differing from every other interview. As students,
the founders of Ñasaindy necessarily approach issues of poverty and development differently
that those who have not been studying such concepts in an official setting. This is evident in
their strategies of fundraising and organizational growth. For these students, they view what
they are doing as blending their knowledge, enthusiasm, and ability towards efforts that are the
“responsibility of any citizen.” They see themselves making educated contributions to an issue,
with the idea that the self-sustainment of the villeros can be attained.
In the nearly six months since my interview with Martín, Ñasaindy has grown and
developed as an organization. One of the most notable forms of their growth has been through
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technology – both with their own website and the use of social networking tools like Facebook
and Twitter. Similarly, they target a young market by combining fundraising and advertisement
strategies through the sale of rubber and cloth bracelets printed with the organization's name.
Further funding is found through periodic peñas, or “folklore nights,” where the attendees enjoy
music, food, and dancing. Not only do these evening bring financial support to Ñasaindy, they
often also serve as a place to recruit new volunteers, build relationships, and network. These
tactics differ from many of the other organizations, and continue to show the youth of Ñasaindy's
founders. In the last six months, Ñasaindy has grown considerably from what it was when
Martín and I spoke; the students and young professionals have invested their time, energy, and
creativity to developing a functional social organization that is relevant to the villa communities
with which they work, as well as the technologically-savvy global community with whom they
partner.

Vivimos Juntos, a community center located inside Ciudad Oculta, is a project that offers
accredited85 kindergarten classes for small children, after-school support for older students, as
well as workshops for adult-learners in the neighborhood. Luis, the founder, is a Brazilian who
first came to Buenos Aires in 1994 with a religious student exchange group. After spending time
in Ciudad Oculta, he returned with the group to Brazil, yet was compelled by his experience and
knew that he would be returning to Argentina to work in that villa. When he did, though, he was
not supported – financially or otherwise – by his church, as they told him that they would not
back a mission that was largely social rather than religious. The growth of Vivimos Juntos was
85 The kindergarten classes are the only aspect of the organization that is assisted by the government: the two
kindergarten teachers are state employees. This provides the community with a local official kindergarten option
for their children, as well as beginning the relationship between Vivimos Juntos and youth at an early age.
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gradual, yet it has developed into a place where adults and children can take classes, receive
counseling, and find educational resources.
A member of CARE Argentina once said that Vivimos Juntos was like the first model of
CARE itself – it was the same program, but in a much more elementary stage. Although I went
into the interview with this in mind, I found something very much different. Vivimos Juntos
does not just offer temporary after-school programs; rather, it focuses on projects that engage
students to enroll for several months in an on-going class with a progressive curriculum. Also,
unlike CARE, Vivimos Juntos is not looking to gain more and more volunteers – its programs
are not as volunteer-based. Rather, it seeks semesterly or yearly contracts with volunteers that
can offer a skill to be taught in classroom form – like guitar, English, or even computer
programming.
Looking forward to the future, Luis wants to secure a new building for Vivimos Juntos.
Eventually, his churched offered to help him – once they saw the positive results of his
relationship-building – and provided the organization with a physical location. However, he
doesn't like that the church has the final word simply because it owns the building in which he
operates all of the program's activities. “If we fight... we could be out a building... and then we
would vivimos juntos (live together) in the street.” He laughs, a play on words of his
organization's name, yet his unease in relying so heavily on the church with potentially different
objectives clearly weighs heavily for Luis. “Ideally, I'd like to have a place for children
recovering from addictions, even as young as thirteen. There is no specific place for them to go,
now.” His goals remain social – not religious – and this stands as a potential conflict with one of
the primary funders.
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Voluntario Internacional is an organization designed to connect volunteers with
opportunities to work. Essentially, it works as a intermediary, providing willing volunteers with
contacts and activities at a project, like an orphanage or comedor. Voluntario Internacional has
programs not simply in Buenos Aires, but also in the northern province of Misiones and the
central province of Entre Ríos. One of the highlights of the program according to Graciela, the
director of volunteers, is that each volunteer is placed specifically with a site that will draw on
his or her talents – for example, a person with limited Spanish skills would not be asked to help
in a rotation of Health Clinics; rather, the individual would be placed in an English tutoring
program, or with a children's art and music initiative.
A noticeable difference between Voluntario Internacional and all of the other
organizations I worked with is that its volunteers and founders, as Graciela says, “don't create
anything.” The programs it works with are already functioning projects and organizations, and
Voluntario Internacional simply provides volunteers that can give time and energy to help where
needed. In this way, it might be compared to CARE's work with Alianza; however, it would be
more similar if CARE were simply to give Filomena's name, contact information, and day of
center's activities to a prospective volunteer. Because, unlike CARE, Voluntario Internacional
does not organize the projects themselves.
Essentially, Voluntario Internacional is a business, selling volunteer positions at local
organizations to international volunteers seeking an “enriching experience.” Benefits of this
model are the ease with which a potential volunteer is able to find a location in which to help.
Assuming that the organization partners with community projects that are actually beneficial to
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the people they serve, it cuts down on the likelihood of a foreigner placing time and money into
misguided and occasionally capricious projects. The third-party organization can act as a screen
through which willing parties can participate and contribute, having been assured that their
resources are not being wasted. At the same time, organizations like Voluntario Internacional
raise questions of how the act of volunteering has begun to resemble an alternative tourist
attraction, and if this is ethically justifiable.

Voluntarios Sin Límites is an organization similar to CARE, though its operations are
geared less towards an English-speaking international base, and more towards South American
internationals. Like Vivimos Juntos, Sin Límites focuses on providing educational opportuniities
to youth and adults, as well as play time for younger children. In fact, this organization is an
interesting mix between CARE, Voluntario Internacional, and Vivimos Juntos. It, like the first
two, recruits volunteers on a large scale and, like Voluntario Internacional, places each volunteer
in a setting that will be most beneficial to both the volunteer and the community site. One of the
key differences between his organization and those like CARE and Voluntario Internacional,
proclaims Facundo, the founder and director, is that Sin Límites does not charge a fee to its
volunteers - “we would never fall to that.” Like Santiago of Fundación Las Aulas, founder and
director Facundo views the organization's volunteers as one of its greatest assets. For this
reason, he believes it highly counterproductive to require them to pay to give their time.
However, with the exception of the volunteer fee and the fact that Sin Límites is predominantly
spanish-speaking, it resembles CARE to a large degree.
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III. ORGANIZATIONAL TRAITS
From the beginning, my goal was to understand who the non-governmental actors are,
what they do for the development of vulnerably poor communities and if these actions are,
ultimately, effective. To find effectiveness, this study is focused on examining the twelve
organizations and identifying shared traits. Classifying them into groupings based on
organizational features, I found that I could identify more clearly the trends that seem to work
well and those that do not.
Within these twelve NGOs, I found that there are broad models that can be used to define
and classify the organization of each association. The definitions of these models are often fluid,
so the organization is identified by its position on a sliding scale of specific aspects. These
provide a starting point from which the organizations can be examined, compared, and
understood. The traits that I contrast and compare are the organizations' location, who the
volunteers and employees are, its links – or lack thereof – with similar organizations, its source
of financial support, and its perspectives of the government.

Location
The wind picked up a crumpled newspaper and blew it across the empty street. The
sidewalks were abandoned, as was the road: it was as if I had come into a ghost town. The only
person I could see—a woman—stood a block away, sweeping leaves from her apartment's
doorstep into the street. She stopped as I approached, and looked startled when I asked her
where I could find a specific street; nothing was well-marked. She looked at me for a moment,
and then replied that she did not know, that she was not familiar with the roads.
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“Ojo,” she then warned, “dos cuadras más y estarás en la villa: two more blocks and
you'll be in the villa.”
I was in fact approaching 1-11-14, a villa in Bajo Flores, which is the southern part of
Flores, a neighborhood in south-central Buenos Aires. In other words, this slum is the subsection
of a subsection of a neighborhood – even still, it is inhabited by nearly 20,000 people, according
to the government census of 1999/2000.86 I had an appointment with the director of an
organization that works with women and children of 1-11-14, and so had come with purpose.
Yet, from the moment I stepped off the bus – indeed, from the moment I had remained on the bus
past the last tourist or “central” location –, I had been warily regarded and scanned for what
reasons I could possibly find myself in this part of town.
Arriving at Luz Creciente's office minutes later, with the grey view of the villa just across
the street, I reflected on the difference between this organization and those that are located in the
heart of Buenos Aires, to whose offices one can easily walk from any central place in the city.
Location was, in fact, one of the first differentiating factors I noticed about an organization.
Where its headquarters are is exceptionally indicative of the organization as a whole: it shows its
relationship with the community it aims to serve. The priority of its volunteers and the ideology
of how “help” should be distributed is also made blatantly evident by where the operations are –
be it in the financial district downtown, a wealthy suburb of the city, or in the villa itself. For
Luz Creciente and a few others, all of the organization's operations – office, comedor, and
classroom spaces – are located on site or, in this case, on the street that separates the villa from
the rest of the “proper” barrio.

86 Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Datos Estadísticos de Villas, N.H.T. Y Barrios. Buenos Aires: Gobierno de la Ciudad de
Buenos Aires, 2005.

75

The location of the organization and the scope of projects it provides are often correlated.
Luz Creciente, Asociación Crecer, and Vivimos Juntos – the three organizations with community
centers located in or directly beside the villas with which they work – have the widest range of
targeted age groups. They have kindergarten and daycares, English classes for various age
levels, homework help for school children, and skill-building workshops for adults. The close
contact with the community facilitates the many projects for the members of that area. Because
they are permanent installations in the neighborhood, their interactions show an awareness and
inclusion of the general public. They are immersed in the barrio, and so are able to see and meet
needs that perhaps an outside organization – simply coming and going daily or weekly – may not
see.
Also, as the community surrounding these organizations begin to see the center as a
permanent fixture in the neighborhood – and, ideally, as a positive one – they are able to
approach it with their needs and requests. Over time, some of the projects within organizations
are actually initiated by community members, and thus the organization has even more
legitimacy in the area. In all the time I spent at Vivimos Juntos, the community center located in
Ciudad Oculta, the door bell was consistently ringing, and Cristina – the resident “mother” of all
the children, coordinators, and volunteers – was constantly on her feet greeting mothers,
children, and other community members; taking names and phone numbers; giving advice; and,
of course, feeding everyone who would sit and eat. Clearly, Vivimos Juntos is known not only as
a safe space, but also as a useful one, and so the range of those it reaches expands to be
community-wide, and not merely including those involved with specific class and workshops.
Organizations like Voluntarios Sin Límites, CARE Argentina, and Asociación la
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Madrugada have offices situated in the center of the city and surrounding wealthy neighborhoods
– like the Magnificent Mile in Chicago. Undoubtedly, this is most convenient for their
volunteers. As these organizations tend to have far more foreign volunteers than the
organizations located further out of the centralized area of the city, their placement makes sense
for those new to and unfamiliar with Buenos Aires. Volunteers at Luz Creciente and Vivimos
Juntos must travel to some of the most dangerous areas of the city, and often this results in
foreign volunteers being less willing to make the trip. While those who work with CARE or
Voluntarios Sin Límites have an easier experience, the tradeoff of quantity of volunteers for
quality of community relationships seems a high price to pay.

Volunteers
The characteristics of an organization's volunteer – who they are, what they do, where
they are from, how long they stay – was one of the most varied practical concepts among
organizations. Some have no discernible way to become a “part-time” volunteer; others refuse to
take a volunteer who cannot stay for more than three months, or who does not speak Spanish;
and one – Voluntario Internacional – is literally based upon the idea of the transient, foreign
volunteer. The rest fall scattered in between, each with its own characteristics and tendencies. In
fact, all twelve organizations have varying levels of volunteer collaboration. The level to which
is incorporated in the organization – from being a temporary aide to being a key, decisionmaking team member affects how an organization interacts with the community.
When I first arrived at the CARE office, I was surprised to find that not only was my
orientation session presented in English, but also that English seemed to be the primary of
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language of business in the office. Given that this was an Argentine organization in Buenos
Aires, which worked with underprivileged children in local villas, I had assumed that I would be
expected to rapidly improve my Spanish skills. The reality, though, is that the great majority of
the volunteers at CARE are either native English-speakers or at least speak English better than
they do Spanish. Even more revealing is that, at CARE, foreign interns actually hold the
majority of the administrative and activity-site duties, and are often the only ones present at the
office. Interns manage the volunteers' experiences – from preliminary emails and orientations to
transportation and activity coordination. For this reason, many outsiders view CARE as being a
foreign – or even British or American, specifically – organization, and are often surprised to
learn that Rosa, its founder, is Argentine.
In fact, a great deal of the volunteers at many of the organizations I interviewed were
foreigners to Argentina. Every single organization had non-native volunteers, and in the cases of
all but Luz Creciente, Vivimos Juntos, Asociación la Madrugada, Asociación Crecer, Fundación
las Aulas, and Ñasaindy, they outnumbered local volunteers. Voluntario Internacional,
Voluntarios Sin Límites, CARE, and Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro all have volunteer
programs which are largely filled by foreigners. Of that list, CARE and Voluntario Internacional
both have exclusively international volunteers, almost all of which are from English-speaking
countries. Ñasaindy, though it currently has a small number of international volunteers, hopes to
expand into a more international program, but so far is just local. Hogar de Fernando and
Asociación Crecer both accept foreign volunteers, but on a very longterm basis, and only those
who have an exceptional level of Spanish ability.
The organizations that operate on a very local level – like Asociación Madres de Barrio
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San Rafael, Vivimos Juntos, and Luz Creciente – typically have few to no international
volunteers. These are often, for an outsider, the most difficult to find, as they are largely off the
radar – with either no website or one that is not connected to any global networks. The added
nuance, though, is that both Vivimos Juntos and Luz Creciente will use a foreign volunteer,
provided that this individual actually finds them, presents a case for a skill that would be useful
to the organization, and is able to take care of all of their living and travel arrangements. Often,
too, these volunteers will stay for long periods of time – at least five or six months, and often up
to one or two years.
Whether or not volunteers should be required to pay to work with a social organization is
probably the most debated aspect of volunteerism that I found throughout my interviews. Some
organizations charge a fee to volunteer, though they also give their volunteers certain perks,
ranging from a tee-shirt to daily transportation to housing for the duration of the volunteer
“experience.” CARE and Voluntario Internacional fall into this category, with the latter certainly
being more of a “complete package” kind of volunteer experience. Others, like Voluntarios Sin
Límites and Hogar de Fernando, are opposed to this kind of organizational strategy – says
Facundo, of Voluntario Sin Límites: “if they [the volunteers] are giving their time, why would we
force them to pay, too? That is robbery, they can donate money if they want, or just buy a t-shirt,
or nothing at all, if they choose.”
University-age individuals make up the largest percentage of foreign volunteers in the
organizations I talked to, most of these being foreigners. In a city as large as Buenos Aires, there
is an abundance of foreign students, studying abroad or taking a “gap year.” There are, of
course, those who seek out social organizations on their own. Others, though, are helped by third

79

parties. Many international schools and study abroad programs have “volunteer electives” or
human rights courses in which the student is placed with a local organization in order to gain an
awareness of the “other side” of Argentine culture, and to better understand issues of poverty and
aid. Universities that have these programs operate as middlemen much like Voluntario
Internacional. Luz Creciente, Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro, and Vivimos Juntos all receive
primarily western university students from partnerships with programs like these. Their
volunteers rarely seek them out specifically, but are rather matched with them. Often then, they
have fewer volunteers who stay for long periods of time – typically one or two university
semesters. Smaller, more “local” organizations have few public marketing strategies online and
are harder for foreigners to find on their own, making the middlemen necessary for the
connection to be made. Minimal to no online presence also means that these smaller projects
tend to have more Argentine volunteers, who are better able to manage the culture and the
process of finding and building contacts and connections.
Programs like CARE, Voluntarios Sin Límites, and Voluntario Internacional offer
flexibility for internationals who seek a volunteer program that does not require a time
commitment at all. CARE is appreciated by its volunteers for having complete flexibility, both
in total commitment as well as weekly scheduling of volunteer days and locations. However,
this flexibility leads to weaker ties between the volunteers and individuals of the communities in
which the projects are run – which is, arguably, a significant part of a community-based project.
Another consideration of the volunteer is gender. While data from other organization is
lacking, my experience with CARE showed that there was a vast majority of female volunteers –
nearly ten to one, outnumbering the men by a long shot. At the same time, I saw notable
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differences in how the kids responded to the volunteers, based on their gender. In Laferrere
specifically, I watched the way my children interacted differently with me and with my cocoordinator, a male. I noticed significant difference in my kids, as much in the girls as with the
boys. Having a male and female figure balanced our team: boys who would not show me respect
would easily defer to Rig's word, girls were giggly and goofy around him, and he was always
known to be ready for a fútbol game. At the same time, all of the children looked to me as the
keeper of the carpetas, the one who knew what grade they were in, who their siblings were, and
what homework they were doing and how well. More than once Rig and I were jokingly dubbed
the “mom and dad” of Laferrere and, in all actuality, it seemed that our kids responded better to
our system than at other CARE sites. Volunteers continually noticed the respect we had won
from our children; their enthusiasm to do their homework; and the pleasantries between the kids
themselves, with us, and with the volunteers as well. As a coordinator, I worked with every kind
of group dynamic, and I continually observed how much smoother the activity went when we
had a general gender balance. While I have no hard data from the other organizations, it
appeared to me from an outsider's perspective that many of the more functional ones had more
even male-female ratios. A volunteer's gender, of course, is an impossible thing for an
organization to control, yet I believe it should be taken into consideration, especially when
choosing roles of leadership.
Additionally, I found that having locals involved is key. It is vital for the children to not
only be given role models, but specifically role models to which they can relate. Having a
foreigner assist with math homework can be fine – beneficial even – yet the understood fact is
that this foreigner is temporary. This brevity of volunteers does not foster an environment of
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stability and accountability – an element that these children so vitally need. Also, having role
models that understand them more than foreigners can is beneficial for kids.
However, directors working primarily with foreign volunteers continually gave me the
same reasoning for not having more – or any – local volunteers: Argentines simply do not what
to help; the culture of aid and volunteering just does not exist here. However, I also talked to
organizations that have many local volunteers and some – like Luz Creciente – that have an
almost entirely Argentine staff. Certainly, then, it is not the case that no Argentines desire to give
their time to humanitarian projects. Indeed, from my experience, there seem to be many
socially-driven Argentines – they are just not joining up with organizations like CARE or
Voluntario Internacional. As it was these organizations that cater to foreign volunteers in the first
place, my hypothesis is that the apparent lack of local support is really a lack of interest in their
specific projects – few Argentines want to pay money to volunteer in a largely English-speaking
environment with co-volunteers who are constantly changing and with whom they have very
little in common.
Volunteers often make up the majority of an organization's “work force” and, as such, the
breakdown of these volunteers sheds light on the priorities of the organization itself. Some
organizations seem more outwardly focused rather than concentrated on local issues; that is, they
are more interested in increasing their international support than strengthening their relationships
with their communities. Too, themes surrounding the volunteer are important in considering an
organization's work. Projects that use primarily foreign volunteers must be understood as having
limitations that organizations of only locals do not have. These weaknesses range from obvious
and surface-level obstacles like volunteers have a deficient grasp of the language and so being
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restricted in their communication with children or community members, to more fundamental
issues like transitory volunteers who are unfamiliar with the kids' culture being unable to develop
lasting connections within an activity site.

Networks
Sitting in a hard-backed folding chair, slightly shivering from the cold creeping through
the thin walls on the June afternoon, I quietly ate food from the refreshment table and wondered
how I had managed to find myself among this specific group of individuals. Seated in similar
chairs in a wide circle – also shivering, also eating –, were about twenty school counselors,
directors of social organizations, and psychologists, all discussing child abuse: what it consists
of, how to detect it, and how to deal with it – legally and emotionally. I had been invited to this
meeting by Claire, the founder of Hogar de Fernando, and we met in the Fire Department of La
Boca – the space used by Hogar for its after-school activities. At the meeting there was a guest
psychologist who specializes in child abuse and, after she presented a general lecture on the
topic, answered all questions brought up concerning the specific communities and situations of
each attendee. The meeting was informal, yet serious; professional, yet clearly composed of a
group of friends—or at least like-minded acquaintances with similar passions and goals.
This informational get-together is a clear example of the inter-organizational cooperation
that is essential among social organizations. Although each deals with differing populations,
they all share common themes and joining together – whether to complete a project or just for
sharing information and support – is something that seems both beneficial and logical. At first, I
was surprised to find that two of directors I had already interviewed were in attendance at this
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meeting on child abuse – it was then that the fact of the community into which I had immersed
myself really sunk in. Indeed, many of the organizations I talked to discussed the great benefit of
work “en red,” or within a network. Florencia, of Déjelos Venir Adentro, said that it “would be
foolish to try to do this alone... it's a group effort, you know?” Most other directors shared her
sentiment, telling of the importance of solidarity.
However, despite working with similar communities and social problems, not all social
organizations are in contact with each other, nor do they seek the solidarity of working in
partnership. CARE and Voluntario Internacional, while working in partnership with local
comedores and community centers, do not seek mutual support with similar organizations. I
found this to be a major setback of these organizations: they are missing out on the practical
assistance and support of similar organizations, as well as the sense of community and shared
responsibility that comes from engaging in common networks.
It seemed that most organizations could seek more partnerships – even those who claim
the importance of working in network often did not mention the issue further or explain more
specific relationships. In fact, one director offered me the idea that there is actually a force
influencing the opposite of partnered initiatives. Andrés, director of Asociación La Madrugada,
discussed the existence of a certain territoriality between social organizations in any given
places. This is the idea that there are known and respected “territories” of social organizations,
where one NGO has programs and is actively working with a certain population, and so no other
organization may start up projects in the same locale. He had been talking about the locations of
La Madrugada's activities, and then mentioned Laferrere, saying that there was great need in that
part of the province, but they did not go there. This was because, he said, there were already
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other NGOs with projects in the area, and “what right does another organization have to go there,
too?” This idea of having distinct territories among organizations is counterintuitive, as it seems
that social organizations should work to be more integrated rather than less, viewing their goals
as being more aligned than different or opposing. The organizations the work together do not
seem to share Andrés' sentiment about territorial organizations, instead viewing their mission as a
piece of a greater structure of aid and change. Through working together in networks, rather
than seeking to becoming less united and more territory-centered, small organizations can find
support for their individual projects.

Funding
Of all of the questions that I asked the heads of these organizations, details of finances
were not first on my mind when I first began conducting interviews; rather, it seemed a fairly
general question to ask an operating organization. However, the answers I received quickly
stood out as some of the most interesting and telling topics raised. While the answers range in
emotionality and transparency, most show a consistent trend in financial source: donations from
individuals and business, volunteer contributions/fees, and government grants were the most
common forms of funding. However, Alianza de Las Madres del Barrio San Rafael and
Fundación Las Aulas stand out as exceptional cases.
Perhaps the most thought-provoking – albeit dissatisfying – answer with regards to
funding came from Filomena of Alianza. Her answer stands out not because it reveals any
different source of money than the others, per se, but rather because of its lack of logic.
Filomena concurrently states that the association receives “no aid... from anyone or any place;”
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that it receives clothing from a local padrino (patron, or benefactor) church; and that there is a
subsidy (for an undisclosed amount of money) that is covered by an anonymous donor. At the
same time, I also know from my own experience with the organization that, just prior to me
starting as site coordinator of Laferrere, five wooden tables were given to the Alianza for use in
the children's activities by the municipal government. Also, CARE, with whom I was connected
to Filomena in the first place, provides not only after-school support for the children, but also
merienda twice weekly, birthday parties monthly – replete with milk, cake, cookies and gifts –,
and shoes and school supplies yearly. Her claim of having “no help” seems limited, and
disregards several contradicting facts. That is not to say that Filomena does not feel at a
disadvantage, nor that she is wrong in wanting more funding to be able to provide more activities
and projects for her community – that is not at all my intention. Rather, her response made me
realize that it is the nature of all social organizations to feel a certain monetary sparsity, and that
all answers should be taken with a grain of salt.
The second exemplary answer came from Santiago at Fundación Las Aulas. The primary
source for all of their projects and efforts with schools and the children come from private
individual donors and sponsoring businesses—the typical response. Yet, how they fund
organizational costs was a complete surprise: simply, a parking lot. In the center of the city,
ideally located near offices and shopping centers, a small piece of property is owned by the
organization and has been turned into a small parking lot. This yields a monthly profit large
enough to have 50 percent maintain the lot and the other 50 percent pay the office's rent,
electricity, and the salaries of the four paid employees. Creative solutions like these are so
straightforward, and they certainly relive the organization the stress of needing to pay the

86

“unwanted bills” like utilities and the awkwardness of having to deduct this from donations
intended for projects. Similar projects include monthly or yearly benefit events: be it a concert, a
potluck meal, or even a talent show or musical put on by the kids, these events yield money from
the general community, and are a great way that organizations like Asociación la Madrugada,
Voluntarios Sin Límites, and Ñasaindy have found to raise money for their projects.
Most organizations report receiving little to no financial support from the government.
However, many also claim the government as a source of some assistance. Fundación Déjelos
Venir Adentro has received monetary support from the municipal government for two years.
“Well, three technically,” Florencia says with a laugh, “but with how slow the government is...
thank God we're not a comedor – think if we were trying to feed people, yet still on the state's
schedule! … I don't know how they do it.” The money Déjelos Venir Adentro receives is por
proyecto, or “by the project,” and not a recurring monthly subsidy. This system works well, says
Florencia, whose only complaint is that sometimes the inability of the state to be flexible can be
frustrating. But, she says, “it is good that they keep controls on how the money is spent. It is
their money, and they should do that.” The only time this inflexibility became an issue was when
they received $3000 from the state to buy toys, and then received a physical donation of $5000 in
toys. Florencia presented a petition asking to be able to put the money towards something else
the organization needed at the time – “it's not like I wanted to buy cookies or take everyone in
the office on vacation or anything!” – but was turned down, and had to buy still more toys, “that
just sat on the shelves for almost a year... it was senseless!” Others who receive government
grants por proyecto – and also tell of its notorious tardiness – include Luz Creciente, Asociación
la Madrugada, Asociación Crecer, Fundación las Aulas, and Vivimos Juntos.
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Those who receive neither subsidies nor por proyecto grants claim no interest in receiving
government money at all. Rosa of CARE says that once you accept government money, you
start having to do more and more of what the state wants – your organization loses its autonomy
and ability to pursue its own priorities freely. She, Claire of Hogar de Fernando, and Voluntario
Internacional are all proud to work completely separate from the state.

IV. ABSTRACT THEMES
Along with the more practical aspects that differentiate the social organizations of my
study, there are several more conceptual themes that also act as indicators of effectiveness.
Whereas the last section focused primarily on aspects of how the organization runs its projects,
through detailing location, volunteers, and finances, this section focuses more on the abstract
ideas through which the organization operates. That is, this section draws attention to how
cultural context, perspectives of the government, the dichotomy between help and “poverty
tourism,” the notion of fighting marginalization as opposed to poverty, and the importance of
relationships all shape an organization's value in a given community.

Perspectives on government
Not surprisingly, I found that organizational attitudes toward the state paralleled whether
or not the organization received governmental financial support. Andrés and Facundo of
Asociación de la Madrugada and Voluntarios Sin Límites, respectively, both spoke vehemently
of the positivity of the current government; both receive – or have received in the past – grants
por proyecto from the municipal, provincial, or national government. When asked of the
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possibility of the government providing poverty aid programs with electoral ends, Andrés admits
that there may be that issues, yet says, “...I don't care why the government puts in money … even
if it is just when there is an election ... if it gets to a kid, it's fine.” Facundo, on the other hand,
replied with a quick, “Who told you that? Did somebody say that that is how it works?” While
he balks at the idea of criticizing the government, he also admits that his organization does not
have any connection with the state. Continuing on, he says:
We don't have even one... not even one direct link with any state network, nor a
problem with having one... it's... it's necessary to have a … to be present... no?..
we don't have an anti-state position. At all. Nor do we have a relationship. At all.
But it doesn't seem to me to be very mature to have an anti-state position... or antigovernment – it does nothing (no sirve nada, eso, nada).
For many, there seems to be a direct connection between opinion of the government and
organizational access to government aid. As the director of an organization heavily funded with
government subsidies, Andrés by no means criticizes government actions. He is very progovernment, because Asociación La Madrugada benefits from government money made
available to it. At the same time, Andrés does not consider himself nor his organization to be
puppets of the government. While he recognizes that governments may have ulterior motives in
how and to whom they give aid, he finds that this fact is inconsequential if the money indeed
reaches a worthy project. Also, he agrees with the current guidelines of government grants: that
the state should dictate how its money is spent. Others though, like Rosa of CARE, would say
he is “in the state's pocket” for this belief and its implicit effects on his organization.
Showing less emotion and absolute backing of state practices, both Florencia from
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Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro and Marcela from Asociación Crecer speak with a conservative
pragmatism towards the government, and its relationship to society. It should be noted, too, that
both receive periodic governmental por proyecto grants for their organizations. Florencia spoke
with great disgust of the state-provided assistance programs, saying that government programs
that simply give money or necessary goods to poor people are not helping or changing anything
and, worse, “they are not making the person decent … they are not treated as worthwhile: it is
degrading for these people.” She goes on to say that those who really have needs are receiving
nothing and are in the same position as they were five years ago - “and, with all of these
supposedly wonderful changes of the economy, if they are the same, then they are worse.” She
calls for the government to “dignify” its poorest population, not simply keep it where it is at,
through meaningless asistencia, or assistance, programs.
Marcela, as a former state employee, provides another perspective of the government and
its role in social welfare. Trained as a sociologist, she began her career by working for the state.
Unsatisfied with the “government time” though, she left public office work and found herself
spending her free time volunteering at Asociación CRECER. She loved it, and was gradually
promoted to her present role as director. Like Florencia, Marcela talks of her hope in the
goodness of the state, and believes that many of its efforts are not ill-founded. However, she
notes that often the message of the government's programs are good, “yet they don't do what they
say.” Too, she sees that its short-sightedness poses a hindrance to efficacy; the government
needs to have a more long-term vision as it moves forward with planning and programs,
“thinking of future generations … they are just thinking of today, and not tomorrow.” She, too,
believes that the state should aim at projects beyond simple assistance programs to effect real
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change.
For the most part, I found that the non-governmental social organizations of Buenos Aires
that were committed to offering aid to the poorest and most vulnerable populations of the city did
not see themselves as any sort of replacement for the government. They see value in the state,
and in its programs, be they limited or even under-achieving. However, they do not see
themselves acting in a capacity which undermines the actions of the government. Social
organizations focus on the government's recent trends toward social spending, and call for further
actions. They recognize that there is a large deficiency, and even criticize some of the state's
techniques and methods, yet most are hopeful that the government will continue to grow into the
role of an effective social actor in Argentina.

Culture
Culture plays an important role in the way that social organizations are run in Argentina.
Latin America is notorious for having a laid-back culture that runs on a schedule far different
than that of Wall Street and London Square's nine-to-five business world. There is, of course, a
very practical side of this culture that comes to the surface quickly: emails are tardy, meetings
are late or cancelled last minute, business is more “relaxed.” However, all of these seem to be
superficial details. Of course, they may be what is most evident, most quickly – however, there
is an aspect of the unhurried culture that runs even deeper. Beyond the missed calls, unorthodox
meetings, and the unperturbed lateness of so many Argentines, the relaxed values manifest
themselves organizationally through a lack of transparency and, at times, an impenetrable
hierarchy.
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Transparency within a social organization is key, because it allows for a common
understanding of how the system functions by all those involved, it makes needs and surpluses
evident, and it gives donors confidence that their money is going to good use. Primarily through
my time at CARE – though to a lesser degree from my interviews, as well – I found a general
lack of openness, not only with those on the outside, but also between members of the
organization itself. This surprising pattern of minimal organizational transparency presented
itself early in my study. Within the first few days interning at CARE, I noticed that there were
unclear and unmentioned topics, even to those who had been a part of the organization for a great
period of time. At first, I thought that my exclusion from certain information was simply a result
of my newness, and assumed that with time I would come to know how CARE operated.
Over the course of the next six months, however, I saw little change in CARE's level of
transparency. I was placed in charge of the Research Team: among other tasks, we looked into
new funding options for CARE. This became an increasingly difficult challenge, as I soon
realized that in many respects, my hands were tied: I had to eliminate many grant options
because they asked for budget charts, project costs, and year-end financial reviews. It was not
that this information was not available to only me or any other person at my level, but rather that
the data essentially did not exist. There are no official records of organizational spending or
costs beyond Rosa's mental count, and even this she is reluctant to share with anyone. The lack
of accountability trickles down through the organization to where there is a general sense of
unease and frustration at “the way things work,” and the inefficiency of getting problems
resolved.
Related to the idea of transparency, another way that the easygoing Argentine culture gets

92

in the way of the “business” of an organization is through the hierarchical structure of social
organizations. Several organizations I spoke with are still actively directed by the individual that
founded the project, and often this leads to an uneven balance of power, or disagreements
regarding the organization's mission and direction. CARE, Asociación La Madrugada,
Voluntarios Sin Límites, Vivimos Juntos, Luz Creciente, and even Alianza de las Madres del
Bario San Rafael, all have dynamic founding leaders, and all show signs of internal power
struggles. In CARE, there is often tension between Rosa and her son or the interns, as new
projects are proposed and methods explored. She fears losing control of the project she began,
and resists the changes that new management may bring, yet continues to place significant
responsibility in the hands of interns. Similarly, Andrés refers to Asociación La Madrugada as
his organization and, pointing to himself, says with a loud chuckle, “he that weighs the most, has
the most power.” Across the board, there seems to be a recurring theme of one leader at the top
controlling – or failing to control – the actions of all underneath. Only Florencia of Déjelos
Venir Adentro seems to have broken this patriarchal role: “starting this year, I've tried to remove
myself as much as possible … if I say too involved, we won't grow. … But it's hard, you can
imagine.”
Culture in Argentina is not solely an issue of the eight-to-five business day shifting to a
ten-to-seven one. Rather, culture permeates to a level of organizational ambiguity and rigid
pecking orders. These traits can decrease an organization's ability to function effectively
internally, and can also cause a loss of external relationships and, sometimes, of funding or the
possibility of funding.
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Is this help, or is this tourism?
At the beginning of each orientation session with new volunteers at CARE, I first would
introduce myself, telling them who I was, how I came to be working for the organization, and
about my project and my interest in themes of poverty and inequality. I would then ask the
group to introduce themselves and describe how and why each were there, wanting to become
volunteers. The answers I received varied only slightly among the nearly 250 volunteers that I
talked to over my five months as orientation leader. Most frequently, I would hear the phrases “I
just want to help,” “I want to give back,” or “I wanted to see the other side of Argentina” as the
reason that the individual sought CARE out and wanted to volunteer their time while on their
study abroad trip, gap year, or spring break.
This is one of the most troubling issues I found as I worked with CARE and interviewed
aid organizations: the idea of “help.” It is a word that is simultaneously complex and overly
simplistic. So frequently used, its meaning has become assumed knowledge, yet few have truly
defined it. At first glance, one might say that it is a term oft misused; however, having never
truly received a definition, it is more true that it is simply overused. It is a cliché term that,
presumably, intends to denote a humanitarian good will. “Help” implies that a specific need has
been identified and that the solution is known, or perhaps is being evaluated and researched.
Ideally, it indicates that the efforts being made are positive; that they have been thought out and
found to be truly beneficial to those receiving the aid. However, its tacit implication is that there
be a well-off individual who helps, and a less fortunate one who is helped.
One of the large drawback of organizations like as CARE and Voluntario Internacional is
that, because they tend to deal mostly with foreign volunteers, they are also more than likely also
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with a majority tourists. And, with this great influx of foreigners – all desiring to “help” – there
is a blurred line as to what is effective aid, and what is merely a new form of tourism. There are
those who blatantly stated that curiosity was, in part, their goal of volunteering with CARE: to
see “the other side.” However, I believe that there are far more that fall into this category than
just those who gave this as a reason for their volunteerism. There is a propensity for large
organizations that attract a high volume of foreigners as volunteers to tow the thin line between
“volunteerism” and what I call “poverty tourism.”
This of course opens a much wider discourse of what “help” means, precisely, in either
the local or global sense of the term. What does it mean, really, to “help” another person – and is
that a worthy goal? Further, do the reasons motivating a person to give their time or money
affect the aid received? The classic “give a man a fish” anecdote was rephrased by Graciela,
who said, “If you give one woman who lives on the street a meal one night, that's great. And
then, you give it to her the next night, and the next. Soon, you are giving a meal to her every
night... what happens if you get sick, or go on vacation? What is she going to do?” And yet, in
so many cases, the volunteers, or those willing to help, are transient, and do not have the time to
help in this long-term scenario. Is there room for the type of help they offer, or is including them
in the framework of philanthropic work detrimental to the eventual development and self-caring
of the poor communities?
If anyone runs the risk of Poverty Tourism, it is in fact organizations like Voluntario
Internacional whose function is to connect willing volunteers with local organizations. They are
businesses that act as brokers between local humanitarian projects and foreign volunteers seeking
a “complete experience.” Many of their volunteers are short-term students or travelers, with
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little interest in getting deeply involved in the programs to which they are assigned. These
tourists often have agendas different from that of social welfare, and do this to complete a sense
of duty to “helping” or “giving back.” This leads often to a skewed image of reality of who the
poor people are, what their skills and abilities are, and what real aid or development might look
like.
There are several potential downfalls of this strategy, key among them that it is a market
based on the fact that poor populations existing and needing aid. There is a slippery slope from
being an objective third party willing to connect individuals with volunteer opportunities and
running a shady Poverty Tourism organization, in which the poor feel unnecessarily used and
minimally aided. With all organizations and any aid process, this of course is an obstacle to
avoid, though I found especially with those programs that dealt primarily with large quantities of
foreign volunteers that this was a potential hazard. They exist because poverty exists, and they
thrive off of people who want to “see poverty.”
Two contrasting experiences that example the difference between legitimate help and
poverty tourism are ones I had with American university student groups coming to work with
CARE. The first group was 16 students from an expensive state university in New York. The
university's office in Buenos Aires requested one day of volunteering for their students who were
spending a semester abroad in the city, arranging to donate a sum of money for a day-long
excursion for their students. The Saturday that they wanted to go, we picked the students up
from their posh university building in a wealthy subsection of the city, and bused them privately
to Laferrere. Another intern and I conducted a mini-orientation on the ride out which, for many
of the students, was the first they had heard of Argentina's specific poverty issues. The day was
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spent doing none of our normal activities; instead, we played games, made crafts, and ate
hamburgers that the university's donation had bought. Throughout the day, many of the students
interacted with only each other rather than with the kids, speaking in English about the clothes of
the women, the condition of the courtyard and street, and even the lack of salad dressing. All
day long, it seemed that these extremely temporary “volunteers” could only see how the day was
about them: this was a piece of their experience, a day to see something new and different, much
like going to a museum or zoo as a field trip. And, as it was my site we had taken them to, I
especially felt as if I – and CARE – had sold out our kids.
The second group, from Chicago, was by all appearances a group expecting the same
kind of poverty tourism experience that the group from New York had wanted. However, it was
astoundingly different. The students had decided to take an alternative spring break, and had
contacted CARE months in advance to see if they could partner with us to do a week of service.
I had the opportunity to lead this group for the first half of their time. Knowing they only had six
volunteer days before returning to the United States, the group asked not to do the regular
volunteering, but rather any “special projects” that we needed accomplished at the various sites.
For six days, this group of twenty-four American university students donated their time and
money to manual labor projects that needed to be done. We built shelves, moved sand and
bricks, and painted. Only on two of the days did the students have any extensive contact with the
kids, and both were special activities that were as much a treat for the students as for our kids.
Unlike the first group, these students desired to see their time and money put to use in ways that
would be significant for the children and the community; rather than personal enjoyment.
In cases like Luz Creciente and Vivimos Juntos, it is clear that volunteers – even
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international volunteers – are seen as a tool, a resource, and that the goal of an organization is not
lost in facilitating them. In organizations like Voluntario Internacional, though, the organization
is centered not around the project, but rather around the volunteer: the fact that the local
organizations – and the poverty they serve – exist is necessary for Voluntario Internacional's
success. Organizations like CARE fall somewhere between the extremes of being a local
organization and being a business for foreigners: of course, it still has its own projects, and its
motivation today is not far from Rosa's original intent. In the two examples of student groups, it
was clear that one simply wanted to take from the experiences, while the other truly wanted to
see their time, effort, and money go towards some positive change. Organizations, then, differ in
how they approach these two kinds of volunteers: they either create tourist experiences for
foreigners, or they facilitate a volunteer's drive to be used by providing real and meaningful
volunteer roles. Poverty Tourism stems from an organization's focus on the volunteer and their
experience rather than on the project itself. Often this distinction comes at the cost of the
community being “helped” – whether by feeling used, or by simply not being helped to any
noteworthy extent, these local communities are not benefited by Poverty Tourism.

Decreasing Marginalization vs. Poverty Alleviation
“There is a social problem far worse than poverty, mi amor, and it is called
marginalization,” Rosa, the founder and director of CARE, said to me one evening. “It's like the
trash. People need to think... but they don't think of what they throw away, they just put it all in
there. And those who come after … the cartoneros … they'll cut themselves on a tin or broken
glass that someone has put into a bag without thought.”
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The problem she spoke is an idea that is common to many of the organizations with
whom I spoke. Alleviating poverty is not their primary goal: rather, they are fighting
marginalization. It is not merely because a child is poor that she does not finish secondary
school; it is the entire social construct into which she has been built. From the distinction
between a villa and a barrio of the city, to the fear and assumed danger of a villero, culture has
built a wall between the “proper” society and city, and the “other.” CARE, in good company
with organizations like Hogar de Fernando, Fundación Déjelos Venir Adentro, Asociación la
Madrugada, Vivimos Juntos, and Ñasaindy, sees itself as an organization whose primary function
is not to fight the beast of poverty; rather, the devil of marginalization. It is marginalization
which hinders children from knowing their own city; which causes them to grow up believing in
their own nature as the “outsider”; which turns the into an uncaring machine, unconcerned with
issues beyond our narrow range of vision.
Indeed, it seems that the very structure of the system now not only supports, but demands
the existence of these shantytown communities and their “other” population. There are no
supports that lead to the possibility of an exit; even systems like education are not provided in a
way that will make a notable difference for these children. “One could easily argue that their
educational experiences are not intended to and cannot prepare [them] to function in the same
society and the same economy.”87 Social organizations, then, build themselves to be the agents
that bring these communities – beginning with children – up out of the “otherness” that exists
between the “invisible wall of economic redundancy, educational exclusion, state abandonment
and sustained stigmatization [that] has been erected.”88

87 Orfield 1985, as quoted in Auyero, op. cit. (Bronx), p.52.
88 Ibid. (Auyero), p.48.
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For Rosa, the fight against marginalization manifests in her ability to bring together
cultures and worlds: by introducing foreign volunteers to villero children, she is both showing
the volunteer a world of poverty they may never have seen, as well as giving the child a glimpse
of a world beyond their own – one of education and of travel. Her birthday parties and play days
are envisioned as days to “make the child feel as any other child might.” Other programs, like
Hogar de Fernando and Asociación la Madrugada, focus on a child's creative nature to minimize
certain themes of marginalization. By encouraging a child to produce art, and to let themselves
be creative, they help that child see her own ability, and have a place to express her feelings. In
this way, if marginalization is the “averted gaze”89 of the government, then the actions and
projects of these social organizations are a firm redirection of regard.

Relationships
For organizations aimed at minimizing marginalization, and especially those that do so
through work specifically with children, building real and meaningful relationships is one of the
most important aspects of any project. Relationships that are built between short-term volunteers
and longer-term staff, between volunteers and kids, and even between community members
themselves not only increase the likelihood of success of the organization, but also of any
community initiatives and development. For any meaningful change to take place within a
community, there needs to be strong relationships on multiple levels.
To say that relationships are paramount to structural change may seem a quixotic
approach to problems complex as poverty and intense social marginalization; an idealistic cover
of more pragmatic issues. Indeed it was not—by any stretch—the hypothesis I had set out to
89 Auyero, op. cit. (Bronx), p.48.
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prove. In fact, it was a gradual change in approach. Rooted academically in the political and
economic history of Argentina's poverty, I began to insert myself into the community through
intuition, adjusting my own actions – and, later, aspects of CARE's systematic approach at my
site – based on the reactions and results of the kids that I had begun to know well. Then, using
this as a baseline from which I saw all other organizations, I started to see the great parallel
between my own informal experience, and the experiences of all organizations: relationships are
key to a healthy and effective social organization.
In my time at CARE, the pattern that I consistently saw repeated by foreign volunteers
was the lack of a big picture. The interns who stayed for long periods of time would become so
internally-focused, increasingly preoccupied with the daily tasks of running the office, that they
would frequently forget about the children for whom the work was done. Florencia of Déjelos
Venir Adrento spoke to this tendency when she said that “you always have to stay connected to
the kids, or you'll forget what you're doing.” On a higher organizational level, the trend was
consistent: many social organizations spend more time recruiting more volunteers – growing the
organization – than they do seeking ways to improve the services they provide to people. Their
interests shift, becoming more about gaining volunteers and recognition and less about
interacting with marginalized communities and meeting needs.
It is through developing a strong base of trust that any other efforts may be realized. For
this reason, organizations who focus their outreach efforts on securing only volunteers run the
risk of never fully being able to attain a level of genuine establishment in their target
communities, because their volunteers are so transient. As a foreigner myself, I cannot say that I
truly integrated into Laferrere in the six months that I was the site's coordinator; although I
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worked with the kids longer than any other CARE volunteer ever had, I was still temporary, in a
larger sense.
For six months, though, I made it my goal to accomplish just one thing: to let the children
learn to trust in accountability. I was given the responsibility of Laferrere because nobody else
wanted it. “The kids are bad,” I was told by other interns who had gone for a week or two. What
I found, though, was that the kids just needed a relationship with someone to whom they had to
be accountable, and who would be accountable to them. It was in this context that I began the
worksheet system with the individualized carpetas. I worked to learn the children's names and
what they were doing in school. I spoke to their parents to see how I could better target their
problem subjects. Gradually, the kids opened up to me.
One day in April, about a month into my time at Laferrere, I played a game of modified
hide-and-seek with some of my kids outside. The object of the game is for the player who is “it”
to either tag the others, having found them in hiding, or hit the “home-base” wall and called out
the names of those racing to safety, automatically getting them “out.” Having been in hiding for
awhile, Ximena – the girl with whom I had taken cover behind a car – and I decided to make a
run for Home Base. Fernando – the boy who was “it” that round – saw us coming, though, and
raced to the wall, beating us squarely. He proudly slapped the wall with his hand, proclaiming
“pica Ximena y Pica la de CARE – Ximena is out and the girl from CARE is out.” I paused, then
slapped the wall myself, declaring “No, I'm not.” Fernando looked at me, dumbfounded – “But I
said your name: you're out.” “No, you said 'La de CARE,' – that's not a name. I've been here one
month, I'll be here four more, it's time you know who I am. You are Fernando, you are in grade
five, you pretend you only know math up to multiplication, but you can really do division, too. I
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know you, you should know me by now, too.” Everyone who had been playing gathered around
us, staring at me in astonishment, and then the game simply resumed.
The next week, all the children called me Elisabeth. Within two weeks, they had
shortened it to Eli. By June, when I had seven children screaming my nickname from various
corners of the courtyard – all requiring my immediate attention – I almost regretted taking this
first step of familiarity. In all actually, though, the level to which my kids at Laferrere came to
count on my presence was an acknowledgement of how important personal relationships are.
Volunteers soon came to know Laferrere not for its “bad” kids, but the for the most diligent
students and polite children – who actually took the time to greet each volunteer and learn his or
her name.
One of the unifying factors of these organizations is that they build relationships.
Whether through play, through school support, or even through the arts, they bring children in to
relationships, and focus on an interpersonal skill set – they are building the child's ability to
relate and to be in a social setting. Organizations that focus on the relationship-building aspect
of their projects are ensuring its effectiveness: only through strong relationships can an
organization both last in a community and have its projects be successful for the children's
development.
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4

. PROJECT PROPOSAL

Examining existing aid organizations and their efficacy is only truly meaningful in the
context of being used as a teaching device for how to move forward. Case studies, reviews of
contemporary theoretical thought, and assessments of current programs contribute to a certain
literature and are made useful by their ability to deepen pragmatic knowledge and effect practical
change. A necessary step of this project then, having given both the contextual build-up for aid
organizations in Buenos Aires and an examination of several existing projects in the city, is to
propose what could be done in the future to further enhance the utility of such organizations.
This is not a statement of what must be done, across the board; rather, it is an idea as to what may
be another viable project, given what I have observed through my work with twelve existing aid

104

organizations in Buenos Aires.
The basic premise of the project I propose is that it be a self-supporting social
organization, focused on creating a safe place for children that cultivates their creativity and
supports their educational development. Like Fundación Las Aulas with its use of a parking lot
as a source of funding, this organization would operate on two levels, having both a business and
a social facet. The goal is that it not be static, but would change as the community needed; as
kids grow and develop, so too would the organization to meet their new needs. Before getting
into a detailed plan of the project, though, I would like to assume three basic understandings of
the proposal: that it targets reducing marginalization as its core mission, rather than poverty; that
it spends considerable time investing into a specific community; and that it is a small venture,
not an international – or even national – one.

Three Assumptions
It is clear that marginalization runs deep in a country, where the wealthiest neighborhoods
of the capital city are separated from villa poverty by merely one six-lane avenue and a set of
train tracks, or a child's first time to go downtown is with an aid organization like CARE. If
social inequality is really one of the greatest issues facing Argentine society, as I believe it is, a
responsive program should make minimizing marginalization a targeted goal. Any proposed
project of a small organization needs to be centered around increasing social integration, rather
than reducing poverty. As discussed earlier, this approach seems to point in the direction of longterm reduction of poverty: only through gaining an equal footing will the poor be able to support
themselves above poverty. Too, it is a more reasonable and practical approach for private
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organizations. Application of this mission statement is carried out through community and
integrative projects, rather than through monetary aid and support. Small, non-governmental
organizations are best equipped for this sort of work: on the one hand, they do not have the
financial capital – as does a government agency – to provide the wholesale relief that is needed
and, on the other, they do have the human capital to establish relationship-based projects that
target issues of inequality within a highly marginalized society.
After establishing that the overarching goal should be to decrease marginalization, a
project does so through building strong community ties. These relationships can be established
in a variety of ways, yet the commonality of each is time. Among the organizations of my study,
in every case where strong and trusting connections exist between an organization and the
community in which it works, that relationship has been developed over time. The students who
formed Ñasaindy ONG had already been involved in Villa 21 for three years; Luis of Vivimos
Juntos had been living and working in the villa Ciudad Oculta for years before he opened the
doors of the center for the first time; even Rosa at CARE developed personal friendships with the
women running each of the comedores and community centers before she was able to bring
foreign volunteers to work and play with the kids. Establishing and developing these
relationships, then, is the necessary first step: investing considerable time into the target
community, building significant relationships, and learning the specific needs of that specific
community.
The third basic assumption that I am making for this proposal is that the organization be a
local one. I clarify this because I believe that all aid organizations focusing on relationships must
begin with just that – real relationships, one-on-one. This means beginning small. Project
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proposals can grow quickly; and while there is certainly room for expansion the model ought to
work as a basic unit, as well. For a newly forming organization, the project must be able to
succeed with small numbers: a project whose mission is to meet the foundational relational need
of an underprivileged child should be able to operate with as little as a willing and compassionate
person, and a space to develop this relationship. For this, one of the greatest advantages of small
social organizations is that they are made of people. People can build trust and teach skills in a
way that faceless government programs cannot.
From these three preliminary guidelines, a project could take many forms. Indeed, given
the personal interests of the individuals heading the initiative, the context of the community, and
any financial or temporal variables, there are any number of ways these guidelines could be met
and the project be effective in its community, yet look nothing like another equally effective
organization. As stated earlier, the project this proposal outlines is one that is financially selfsufficient, and works with kids on a social, educational, and creative level. It also attempts to
address issues of employment, international volunteerism, and community integration.

Hostel Model
Though the idea of running a business and a social organizations as complementary
projects could take many forms – from a bookstore, to a market, to a coffee shop –, for this
proposal I look specifically at the idea of running a hostel as a complementary business to a
social organization. In a city as large as Buenos Aires, there are hundreds of hostels, making it
reasonable to assume that the project is possible. The ideal goal of this project would be to
maintain a profitable hostel, in which children of a local poor neighborhood could find a space to
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do after-school projects, socialize and, later, potentially find employment. With the issue of
marginalization – and the immense stigma attached to being poor – as one of the greatest social
problems, this proposed model serves two purposes. First, it is a very integrated way to include
children in a wider community. And second, it serves as a place of growth for these kids.
As far as community development, this entire idea hinges on the notion of maintaining
strong, long-term relationships and becoming a trusted and valued member of the area –
hopefully, leading the way for other businesses and organizations to become more socially
involved. This would be a local business that is known for inserting itself deeply into the
surrounding community, becoming a trusted hang-out and help for the local kids as well as a
useful resource for parents. The other main purpose of this model is that it be a place for kids to
grow – academically and personally. At first, this would be done by maintaining an atmosphere
of safety, fun, and accountability through school help and creative projects – be that music,
dance, or art. As the kids grow, the model would allow for the youth to find jobs within the
system. An intermediary step, too, may be to begin giving older children responsibilities of the
younger ones, as test-runs of more “official” jobs.
Martín, a director of Ñasaindy, the organization of students and young professionals,
explains how one of the most alarming sectors of the population are the ni-nis, the youth who ni
estudian ni trabajan – neither study nor work. Dropping out of secondary as early as the age of
13 or 14, these young people face few hopeful options for their future. Martín stresses how
important it is to work with children before they get to this stage and to provide resources for
those who are already a part of this group. A project which allows the possibility of internal job
creation is an ideal solution to the problem of the ni-nis. If the social organization with which
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children have been working on homework or art projects is connected to a business, the kids
could be hired to work part-time as they grow older. In the hostel model, there could be a
requirement that a teenager both stay in secondary and maintain certain marks to be able to hold
the job at the front desk, keeping the rooms and common areas clean, or helping with
administrative and bookkeeping work. This fills a practical need of employment, creates a
motivation for kids to continue their education, and gives them a space outside of school – and
also off of the streets – where education and learning is prioritized.
One of the most important assets of this project then, and though also one that presents
significant challenges, is that of its physical location. The program, like Vivimos Juntos and Luz
Creciente, needs to be in the community it serves. This is more difficult in the highly urbanized
city of Buenos Aires than it would be in a smaller urban area like Mendoza or Córdoba. The
unfortunately high degree of inequality in the city, though, actually benefits the placement of an
organization of this sort. Although it cannot serve areas like Villa 15 or Laferrere, because they
are too far from the city center, Villa 31 and La Boca are just two of several examples of
extremely poor areas that are situated immediately next to well-off neighborhoods. This would
be the ideal location for a hostel: somewhere a tourist would stay, yet that is also readily
accessible to the community.
The actual space of the organization is another of the project's key aspects. Of course
there would need to be rooms for the hostel to be a viable part of the project. Too, the building
needs to be designed in such a way that the common area can double as an activity space for the
kids' after-school projects and activities. Preferably, there would be outdoor space to facilitate
fútbol, jumprope, and hide-and-seek, as well as have the potential to grow a small garden.
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Again, this space would be easily attainable in the less dense Mendoza; however, it would not be
impossible or even unlikely to find a space in Buenos Aires with a rooftop or a courtyard that
could function as a community garden, or a nearby park for outdoor play. These spaces would be
where the children – and perhaps their mothers – would come. This is vital because these spaces
are what physically breaks down barriers. A social organization funded by a hostel across town
would be completely separate project, and one not nearly as strongly directed at decreasing
marginalization. Having a place which is shared by both poor children and international
travelers necessitates some convergence of cultures and of ideas. Likewise, an outdoor space for
play and gardening is important as it may be one of the best ways to include parents. Also, it
carries the added potential for being a practical food and income source, as well as being a skillbuilder for adults and children alike.
Regarding foreign volunteers, this hostel model provides a way to use the internationals'
desire to contribute to social development initiatives in projects that do not require depth of
relationship. There are many projects into which short-term volunteers may invest their time,
money, and energy, and be so much more effective than attempting to make a meaningful
connection and “change a life” in the course of an afternoon. Those who stay at the hostel will
not be required to participate in the activities of the organization, nor should all hostel guests
necessarily be or become volunteers. Indeed, at the start of the project, the social and business
aspect should be separated to the extent that the hostel's common area be the only overlap; hostel
guests merely being told that on certain afternoons, after-school activities for local kids take
place in the building as the small-scale initiative of the owner. Only when the organization has
been established and accepted as a safe and trusted part of the community, and the hostel is
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functioning as its own entity, should the two be merged together. Even then, the two will be
distinct; the hostel funds the organization, provides the space of the organization's activities, and
may even house volunteers occasionally, yet still remains a hostel, in all that that entails. In fact,
if the social aspect of the organization is made a priority, there needs to be a team – or at least a
partnership – that helps maintain the business of the hostel itself. The separation is possible, yet
requires deliberate effort.
One of the main considerations of this organization is how it will use these internationals
who wish to volunteer with the kids. In this, it is important that “poverty tourism” be avoided to
all extents possible. In no way should this become a poverty trap where travelers know they can
stay in hostel and “visit the poor.” In the structure of running a hostel, internationals would be
able to volunteer in much the same way that they are familiar with at home – temporarily, and
with little commitment. However, differing from CARE's approach, these volunteers would be
given temporary positions, and their status would be known by the kids – perhaps through a
system of name tags, children and volunteers alike would know there are some “short-termers,”
who can be fun and helpful, yet who are simply there for a matter of days or weeks. Another
way to manage the temporality of volunteers is by having certain activities that can only be
participated in by those staying a determined amount of time. For example, working directly
with the children would require a volunteer to stay a minimum of two weeks; all others would be
able to volunteer in the garden, or in the preparation and planning of school and art activities. An
additional initiative could be to establish relationships with universities in North America to
develop an internships program – applicants could range from Spanish Business to Humanities
majors, interested in placement with the hostel for either its business or social aspect.
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At this point, one concern is that of funding. I agree with Facundo of Voluntarios Sin
Límites that obligating volunteers to pay a fee to assist in a project seems counter-intuitive and
unnecessary. At the same time, volunteers often expect to pay, and they can often be a
significant source of organizational income. Despite this, I believe donations should be
voluntary, and volunteers willing to give their time freely will regard their role as the service that
it is, and not as a good that they have purchased, with the expectation of a specific experience. A
good solution is to give volunteers a reduced rate at the hostel for hours worked. Or, for interns
staying a semester or year, free board for their duration of their involvement.
Over time, the hostel may become known in the travelers' world for its social initiatives,
and those wishing to become involved would seek it out. However, the primary goal would be to
provide a space for the children. The project is a long-term commitment, and would require
more than one person to fully develop both the social and the business facets. However, the
benefits of this plan are that children are given a safe space, within their community, which
would provide a sense of ownership and community. Too, there would be potential for
employment, through the hostel and the garden, which would be highly valuable in such a
community. Above all, the objective would be to integrate into the area and build lasting
relationships, working towards long-term change through the community's youth.
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5

. CONCLUSION

Poor communities in Latin America are not a recent problem. They are, however, both
growing in number as well as becoming an increasingly marginalized sector of society. Villas
existed first as real solutions to housing problems and have grown into the stigmatized centers of
poverty that they are today. Political and economic influences have shaped the expansion of
these areas and have significantly affected the lived experiences of slum dwellers; both through
policies that increase the burden of the poor, as well as those that decrease the state's ability to
provide a safety net. In the context of a decreased government, social organizations have risen as
contemporary non-state actors providing aid to the poor.
The purpose of this project is to serve as a review of the current structure of organized aid
and projects aimed at decreasing marginalization. It is easy to want to criticize an organization
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that does not operate entirely smoothly, or one that lacks communication on several
organizational levels. It is also easy to want to paint every familiar organization in the best
possible light. I hope that this study has done neither. In truth, one cannot be only disastrously
critical of NGOs. Despite weaknesses that many have, these organizations do play a vital role in
the communities in which they work. There is no question that lives are changed because of the
work that they do. I hope to have reviewed with a critical eye the organizations with which I
worked, yet to have also acknowledged the positive changes they are initiating. Certainly, some
methods and practices are more effective than others, and I hope to have highlighted those.
However, in most cases, I would not say that a social organization is an outright negative
influence unless for some reason it is obviously rampant with corruption, or blatantly disregards
the needs or basic respects of the children or community in which it works; these of course
would be severe deviations for any organization focused on welfare and social betterment and,
indeed, do not describe any of the organizations with whom I worked. For the most part, I found
that most social organizations bring some positive change to the communities in which they
work – the question is how much, to whom, and to what efficacy.
The utility of social organizations is shown through several characteristics, both practical
and theoretical. Effectiveness in these kinds of organizations must be based on many factors,
certainly including their proposed mission statements. Beyond intended goals, though, I found
that concrete organizational traits like location, volunteers, and finances, as well as abstract
concerns like cultural tendencies and the dichotomy between help and tourism have impacts on
the extent of the organization's overall utility. Organizations located within or close to their
target communities often had the most comprehensive programs and reached a wider populace;
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networks serve as a means to increased knowledge on shared concerns, as well as a supportsystem for individual organizations; those financed by the government often hesitated to critique
the state, yet many were skeptical of the value of governmental assistance programs; decreasing
marginalization was overwhelmingly the focus of the social organizations with whom I worked,
as opposed to fighting poverty; culture plays an integral role in how an organization is run, both
on a day-to-day and structural level; and the fine line between what is aid and what is simply
tourism directed at the socially curious affects an organization's ability to be effective within a
community. Of all of the traits and themes I studied, however, two of the most influential aspects
I found that affect an organization's utility are the organization's use of volunteers and the
importance that is place on developing meaningful relationships.
Much of an organization's ability to bring effective change is found in how the practical
use of volunteers – specifically, of foreigners. There will always be international volunteers who
wish to “help.” Organizations like CARE and Voluntarios Sin Límites currently offer the best
structure for these individuals, providing ongoing activities which volunteers may attend for any
amount of time, contributing what they choose. However, when local initiatives become so
widely opened to short-term, foreign volunteers, one of the most positive aspects of these
community centers is lost. Temporary volunteers – and especially those who are limited
linguistically – are unable to develop meaningful relationships with the communities in which
they work. Because they stay for such a short time, the depth of their connections is severely
limited. For this reason, initiatives which necessitate lasting relationships should also seek
volunteers and staff who are able to commit to the project. In the case of CARE, volunteers are
placed in the position of tutor and mentor to children. However, the brevity of their time
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disallows them from truly building connections. Often it is the interns, who stay at one site for a
minimum of two months, who are able to develop relationship with the kids that show
measurable change in the kids' school and emotional progress. Whether it hinders the children to
have only temporary volunteers was not something my research was intended to find – though I
believe further research into this idea would be beneficial.
I never intended my research to be so centered on interpersonal relationships and the
notion of building such ties as being integral to promoting change. However, I noticed
significant indicators that having accountability and permanence was a positive input to my
children at Laferrere. So many of these children experience impermanence in nearly every
aspect of their lives – people investing in them, continually and with accountability, is not
something they are accustomed to. To have even one influence that shows them a positive image
of accountability and stability developmentally allows these children a glimpse of life beyond
their narrow villa understanding. The impact of volunteers on the ability to develop significant
relationships signals, to a large degree, the overall efficacy of the organization. Far and above all
other critiques that can be made of organizations who work specifically with underprivileged
children is, in my mind, the ability of any volunteer with any organization to develop a
meaningful relationships with the children with whom they work. As stated by Gro Harlem
Brundtland, former Director-General of the World Health Organization, “Investing in early
childhood means investing in poverty prevention.”90
The work of NGOs, then, should be to support the growth and development of the
individual, facilitating this movement towards change. Meeting physical necessities is

90 Brundtland, Gro Harlem. “Bringing in New Actors.” Escaping the Poverty Trap: Investing in Children in Latin
America. Ed. Ricardo Morán. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 2003. 81-85. p.82.
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something direly needed – however, many times it is a cop-out; a quick fix to a more complex
problem. Hand-outs cannot compare to inspiring the change in the next generation. Besides, if
the role of provider of basic needs falls on anyone, it should be on the government. Yes, there
are inalienable human rights to the access of basic services and good – these, though, ought be
provided by the state. Non-governmental social organizations do not and cannot take the place
of the state in giving support to the social sector. Nor should they. There is, however, a very
specific and important role that they may play in discontinuing intergenerational poverty and
decreasing social marginalization. NGOs are not an across-the-board solution; rather, they are a
tool. If used well, they can be a tool to create growth, movement, and change. They can also
develop into situations that lead to no community development, and only create dependency.
However, if done well, they can certainly be good enough that trying is worth it.
With the severe limitations placed on the government by neoliberal reforms, the dramatic
downsizing of a government-funded welfare state, and the subsequent increased poverty, nongovernmental social organizations have become important actors in issues of poverty in Buenos
Aires. However, many of these organizations do not view themselves as agents of poverty
alleviation. Rather, they claim a much more socially-oriented objective: decreasing the gap
between wealth and poverty that marks Argentina as a highly marginalized society. Moving
forward, the work of these organizations remain important, as does increased government
support of issues of poverty. Only through directed projects of a reductions of poverty and
marginalization will Argentina begin to see change in the landscape of the urban poor.
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